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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a description of a model for a space vehicle operational scenario and the
commands for avionics. This model will be used in developing a dynamic architecture
simulation model using the Statemate CASE tool for validation of the Space Generic Open
Avionics Architecture (SGOAA). The SGOAA has been proposed as an avionics
architecture standard to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
through its Strategic Avionics Technology Working Group (SATWG) and has been accepted
by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) for conversion into an SAE Avionics
Standard. This architecture was developed for the Flight Data Systems Division (FDSD) of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) by
the Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company (LESC), Houston, Texas. This SGOAA
includes a generic system architecture for the entities in spacecraft avionics, a generic
processing external and internal hardware architecture and a nine class model of interfaces.
The SGOAA is both scaleable and recursive and can be applied to any hierarchical level of
hardware/software processing systems.
The SGOAA is documented in Reference [WS94], the proposed standard itself and in
Reference [WS92], the technical guide for the proposed standard. Relevant definitions from
[WS94] are included in this document as Appendix A. An extension of the SGOAA
development effort is a simulation of the actual dynamic behavior of the SGOAA in a
demonstration system design. Modes and states analysis [DW93] provides a valid approach
for the description of dynamic system behavior. Understanding of the dynamic behavior of
a system by development of a system model in the early stages of a project will eliminate
much of the uncertainty now inherent in the design process.
The SGOAA is based on a partitioning between logical and direct avionics system
requirements. It includes architectural functions, hardware, software and interfaces for all
avionics hardware/software processing systems. The SGOAA requirements description
includes both system service software and applications software for a generic
hardware/software processing system, the Space Data System (SDS). The SGOAA Interface
Model is used to define how system requirements are to be applied at the appropriate
system level to determine the logical and direct interface points. System logical data flow
requirements are created for each client/server entity identifying the source of the data and
the end-user of the data, functions to be performed by the server and the characteristic
attributes required of the data. As a service entity, the functions of the SDS that are to be
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modeled to validate the SGOAA model are the functions or services to be performed for the
client entities represented by the commands for services. In certain instances such as
initialization, the SDS is both client and server.
A typical unmanned space vehicle, the Artemis Common Lunar Lander (CLL) was chosen
as a reference vehicle for defining the client/server relationships and functions to be
performed and to provide part of a mission scenario for this analysis. Although the CLL
program was not continued beyond the Phase A stage, the command scenario presented in
this paper addresses the functions of the SDS and as such is sufficiently generic to be
applicable to most spacecraft data systems. References [KIL92], [STA92], [STB92} and [SHU93}
present technical descriptions of the CLL.
This scenario and the accompanying command description is based on a program
consisting of a transportation segment and payload segment. The transportation segment
consists of launch services and the lander system. The lander system consists of three
subsystems: the lander vehicle system (LVS), the ground support system (GSS) and the
flight support system (FSS). Both the GSS and FSS are ground facilities. The GSS is the
control authority prior to launch and the FSS is the control authority after launch.
Command and control is provided through a generic capability referred to as the Space
Operations Control System (SOCS). SOCS functions may be allocated to both ground
mission control facilities (FSS and GSS) and to the onboard space vehicle (LVS) facilities for
autonomous execution.
Section 2 describes the mission scenario to be modeled In the SGOAA simulation. Section 3
provides a description of the behavior in the scenarios of the mission, vehicle and system
elements. Section 4 provides the detailed command and response tables in the SGOAA
model mission scenario addressing the commands (functions) that the SDS must perform
as a service provider for the avionics subsystems. Appendix A provides some key
definitions from [WS94]. Appendix B describes the CLL system and its external and internal
interfaces. Appendix C describes the detailed combinations of the modes and states allowed
in the analysis in a typical mission scenario. Appendix D describes and contains the activity
charts, statecharts and their associated data base for the first phase of a SGOAA simulation
developed using the Statemate modeling tool for the mission scenario described in this
report.
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2. SGOAA MODEL MISSION SCENARIO
The scenario shown in Figure 2-1 and described below represents the mission sequence
adapted from the Artemis Common Lunar Lander program requirements, with additional
assumptions (not fully implemented) of orbital activities to include space station behaviors
[SDAT93]. Three mission phases are generally envisioned (with specific mission modes as
shown in Figure 2-1):
• Pre-flight mission phase
• Flight mission phase
• Terminal mission phase
Scenario behaviors are described by mission phase, based on the modes in [DW93]. Not all
states can be implemented by the systems in response to specific mode commands (see
Appendix C for detailed descriptions of combinations of the possible modes and states).
This section summarizes key features of the scenario elements. The "Spacecraft Command
Response Tables" in Section 4 were derived from Table 3-3 SDS Functional Interfaces of
[SHU92]. Additional commands required to be added to section 4 were based upon the
scenario developed in this section and are shown in bold type in the tables in Section 4. The
modes described in paragraph 3.1 and the mission scenario as described in paragraph 2.2
form the basis for the overall sequence of events.
System and subsystem states described in Section 3 result from commands generated in
response to mode inputs. Commands initiated on the vehicle are indicated as such by the
source being the Command Processor referred to hereafter as SOCS. Commands initiated by
ground control are indicated as such by the source being the GSS prior to launch and the
FSS following launch. Known generic commands are shown in quotation marks. An
example of a command is: "Arm Pyro". The resulting state of the pyro device is that it is
armed. The generic commands are expanded upon to include commands to each affected
system and related to the "Spacecraft Command Response Tables" by Primary Command
number shown in parenthesis. The command number for "Arm Pyro" is (3). Functions that
are not tied to a specific defined command are shown in italics and require identification of
specific additional commands. An example is (emergency ground commands from FSS).
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3 TERMINAL PHASE
Post-Lending Modes
ShuFDown I,k)des
Vehicle Surface ProximBy Operations Mo
Surface Mobile Operations Modes
PRE-FUGHT PHASE _ 1
Pre-Launch Modes
Vehicle Proximity Operations Modes
Deorbit Modes
Landing Modes
Figure 2-1. A Model of the Mission Scenario
2.1 _;ROUNDRULES
Groundrules used to develop and implement the scenario are reviewed below.
• The SDS processor will be powered up, perform Power On Self Test (POST) and
will then boot SDS system software from non-volatile memory whenever power
is applied to the vehicle (following this activation sequence all commands to
power other systems can be routed throughout the SDS). The SDS processor will
also send the results of POST over the communication link to the GSS or FSS
whenever POST occurs.
• Loading of application software for Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C),
Communications and Tracking (C&T), Instrumentation, Power, Propulsion and
SOCS will occur when commanded by the GSS under SDS system software
control following loading of the system software.
• Application software will remain in a non-active state until initially enabled by
GSS command. The GSS is the priority command authority for the vehicle is on
the ground. The FSS is the priority command authority for the vehicle following
launch. In a normal operation mode the vehicle is under command control of
the SOCS. SOCS will control the specific state (going to a state defines what
functions the software will perform) of the application software.
Power is individually applied to all systems.
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• The following states are defined for each item of electronics:
- SDS Processor (1 unit): Operational (Wait for commands and Processing) and
Test (POST and Interruptive).
- Doppler Radar (1 unit): Power-on (idle), Active Ranging (radiating energy)
and Test (POST and Interruptive). This unit goes from idle to active ranging
with a commanded mode change.
- Radar Altimeter (1 unit): Power-on (idle), Active Ranging (radiating energy)
and Test (POST and Interruptive).
- Star Tracker (1 unit): Power-on (idle), Active Tracking and Test (POST and
Interruptive)
- Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU - 1 unit): Operational and Test (POST and
Interruptive)
- Propulsion (8 sets): Power-on, Test, Open and Close Engine Valves
- Pyrotechnics (TBD # of sets): Power-on, Test, Arm Fire
- Thermal (TBD # of Heaters): Heater Power-on, Test
• It is assumed that provisions are made in the design for the capability to activate
the Star Tracker and the Radio Frequency (RF) hardware (Doppler Radar, Radar
Altimeter, and the C&T Transponder) on the launch pad in the Integrated
System Test mode.
• The C&T Transponder powers up into a listen only state (no transmissions) until
commanded to do a state change and then it starts transmitting telemetry.
Commanding a state change when it is transmitting causes it to go back to the
listen only state.
• A "Pwr Up All Sys" command (10.28) will cause the SOCS to issue the
appropriate individual commands to the Electrical Power Distribution (EPD)
System to power up all systems. A "Pwr Dwn Sys" command (10.30) will cause
the SOCS to issue the appropriate commands to power down all systems. In
addition, systems may be individually powered up or down by the appropriate
command.
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2.2 MISSION SCENARIO
All subsystems will be activated prior to launch with a full sequence of commands and data
for a normal mission/trajectory stored onboard [STB92]. No orbital verification phase is
expected. The major mission modes consist of the following events:
• Pre-launch (controlled by launch control via the checkout consoles)
• Launch (controlled by launch vehicle)
• Boost to Earth orbit insertion (controlled by launch vehicle)
• Translunar injection (TLI) from Earth orbit is controlled by the LVS
• Mid-course correction to orbit coast (calculated by FSS and uplinked to LVS for
implementation)
• Follow-up corrections (optional to orbit coast) (calculated by FSS and uplinked to
LVS for implementation)
• Lunar orbit insertion
• Follow-up correction (optional from orbit coast)
• Lunar deorbit
• Powered descent initiation and autonomous landing
• Post landing and shut-down
• Operations by the payload or science mission support systems in the terminal
area (in the CLL, payload operations are treated separately from the spacecraft).
Operations functions are similar for each of the burns following Translunar Injection (TLI).
Each burn is preceded by a period of tracking. The FSS uses this data to calculate new
position updates and uplinks these updates along with changes to stored commands (may
include trajectory corrections) as needed to the LVS. The LVS (GN&C) then autonomously
calculates and executes the burn. Telemetry is sent documenting LVS performance during
the burn based on a preplanned timeline or upon command from the FSS. A state vector
update is performed after landing on the lunar surface and then the FSS commands the
LVS (SOCS) to safe and deactivate.
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3. BEHAVIOR IN THE SCENARIOS
The behavior of an avionics system depends on the scenarios required of it as it performs
the missions of the vehicle. This means the mission and vehicle behavior must be well
defined, and the system behavior must be complementary to and consistent with the
mission and vehicle behavior. This section describes the modes and states which constrain
the allowable behaviors in the system as it performs its mission. The subsequent behaviors
are then described for each mission phase.
3.1 MODES AND _;TATES
Modes and states were defined by studying the interfaces for a space vehicle. The skin of the
spacecraft was defined to be the boundary for partitioning between external and internal
interfaces. The boundary between modes and states was based on partitioning between
activities planned and directly controlled by humans (i.e., a mode) and those activities
directed, in response, by the machine (i.e., a state).
This report only presents a top level overview of the modes and states analysis performed.
[DW93] presents a detailed description of the modes and states defined as applicable to space
generic avionics. The modes and states as described in [DW93] are applied to the CLL
reference vehicle in this paper and are to be implemented in the dynamic simulation.
Presented in the following paragraphs are the definitions of modes and states and how the
modes and states analysis in [DW93] has been applied to the CLL reference vehicle.
Appendix C presents an in-depth discussion of the detailed combinations of modes and
states allowed in the analysis.
3.1.1 MODES AND STATES DEFINED
A mode is a predefined set of hardware and software configurations, and associated
procedures used to organize and manage the conditions of operation for an avionics
system's behavior, as planned (in advance) or directed by a human. Modes may have
several levels of expanding detail. Mode models were developed to define the set of modes
and mode transitions governing the behavior of a generic mission or vehicle. Generic
mode transition diagrams illustrating mode models are provided in [DW93] Tailoring of
these models to a specific mission or vehicle such as CLL requires identification of the set of
allowable commands and responses for each mode.
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States are the activities that a system or subsystem adopts in response to a mode input. A
system/subsystem may step though several states in transitioning between one mode and
another. The key difference between a mode and a state is that a mode is planned in
advance or directed by a human, while a state is the response configuration adopted by a
processing controlled system/subsystem. A state may be a complex configuration with
many subsets, or it may be a simple configuration at the lowest level consisting of a switch
setting such as on-off. State transition models (state transition diagrams) for space generic
avionics were developed and are provided in [DW93].
These definitions from [DW93] are consistent with the definitions for modes and states
found in [SDAT93] and [SSF93]. The definitions in [DW93] are the definitions accepted for
use in this scenario.
3.1.2 SUMMARY OF MODES
To accomplish the mission scenario described above in Section 2.2, the mission modes
shown in Figure 3-1 are needed. For each of these mission modes, ground control can
command the vehicle modes shown in Figure 3-2. The mode categorizes the mission or
vehicle behavior needed in the scenario.
As a result of these mode commands, the avionics system may take one of the states shown
in Figure 3-3, while the SDSS function can take one of the states shown in Figure 3-4. The
state categorizes the resulting system behavior as the avionics implements the mode
commands. Specific commands (as described below) are generated by the system to
implement each mode command.
The Pre-Flight Mission Phase consists of pre-launch operations. The Flight Mission Phase
consists of launch, boost, orbit coast/transfer, space mobile, vehicle proximity, deorbit, and
landing operations. The Terminal Mission Phase consists of post-landing, shut-down,
vehicle surface proximity, and surface mobile operations. These mission phases are
described in the following sections.
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3.2 PRE-FLIGHT MISSION PHASE
The Pre-Flight Mission Phase can enable or inhibit specific vehicle modes and avionics
states while the spacecraft is being prepared for a mission (prior to launch), depending on
implementation of the SOCS ground rules built into the systems and by relay of GSS
ground control commands during startup. The following subsections describe the overall
pre-flight command processing available to support vehicle mode commands to startup the
vehicle subsystem processing.
The numbers shown in ( ) in the following sections are the number of the command from
the command response tables contained in Section 4.
3.2.1 VEHICLE OFF MODE
• GSS issues command to "Load Application software" (10.26)
• GSS issues command "Enable Power System software" (10.12)
• GSS issues command "Power Up All Systems" (10.28) to Power System software,
transitioning the LVS from the Vehicle Off Mode to the Vehicle Initialization
Mode.
3.2.2 VEHICLE INITIALIZATION MODE
• The Power system software in the SDS (already running) w'iU then request SOCS
issue the following sequence of state change commands:
- "Doppler power on" (5.2)
- "Altimeter power on" (6.2)
- "Transmitter power on" (8.2)
- "Star Tracker power on" (14.2)
"IMU power on" (18.2)
3.2.3 INTEGRATED SYSTEM TEST MODE
• GSS issues the following series of state change commands to SOCS to perform
test and monitoring and health and status checks.
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- "SDS processor self test" (10.29)
- "Dump SDS processor memory" (10.3)
- "Enable GN&C" (10.14)
- "Enable C&T" (10.16)
- "Enable Prop" (10.18)
- "Enable command processing (SOCS)" (10.10)
GSS issues the following series of state change commands to applications to
perform test and monitoring and health and status checks. It is assumed that
once a test is commanded the test will run to completion and the test results will
be sent over the ground link to the GSS. The GSS can command the test be
executed multiple times.
- "Arm pyros"(2.1)
- "Un-arm pyros" (2.2)
- "Heater Group 0n" (3.1)
'q-Ieater Group OfF' (3.2)
"Valve control circuits self test" (4.4)
"Doppler self test" (5.6)
"Altimeter self test" (6.6)
'Transponder self test" (8.7)
- "Antenna selection control circuits self test" (9.3)
- "Set time" (10.2)
- "Request time" (7.1)
- "Dump request" (10.3)
- '_tar Tracker Self Test (14.5)
- "IMU Self Test" (18.5)
- "SDS processor hard reset" (10.4). Note: A hard reset causes an automatic
(hardware controlled) recycle of power to the SDS processor, an automatic
reboot of system services software and will send the following power on
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commandsto turn on any systemthat was inadvertently turned off during
the reset.
- - "Doppler power on" (5.2)
- - "Altimeter power on" (6.2)
- - 'Transmitter power on" (8.2)
- - '_tar Tracker power on" (14.2)
- - "IMU power on" (18.2)
• The SDS processor will then issue the following state change commands after
being put in a "hard reset" state without receiving any external commands.
- "Load application software" (10.26)
- "Enable power system software" (10.12)
- "Enable GN&C" (10.14)
- "Enable C&T" (10.16)
"Enable Prop" (10.18)
"Enable command processing (SOCS)" (10.10)
• GSS continues the issuing of the following series of state change commands to
SOCS to perform test and monitoring and health and status checks
"SDS processor soft reset" (10.5). Note: A soft reset causes an automatic reboot
of system services software and will send the following power on commands
to turn any system on that was inadvertently turned off during the reset.
- - "Doppler power on" (5.2)
- - "Altimeter power on" (6.2)
- - 'Transmitter power on" (8.2)
- - "Star Tracker power on" (14.2)
- - "IMU power on" (18.2)
• The SDS processor will then issue the following state change commands after a
"soft reset" without receiving any external commands.
- "Load application software" (10.26)
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"Enablepower system software" (10.12)
"Enable GN&C" (10.14)
"Enable C&T" (10.16)
- "Enable Prop" (10.18)
- "Enable command processing (SOCS)" (10.10)
• GSS will issue the following series of state change commands to the SOCS to test
the ability of disabling and enabling application software.
- "Disable power system software" (10.13)
- "Enable power system software" (10.12)
- "Disable GN&C" (10.15)
- "Enable GN&C" (10.14)
- "Disable C&T" (10.17)
- "Enable C&T" (10.16)
- "Disable Prop" (10.19)
- "Enable Prop" (10.18)
• GSS will issue the following series of commands and associated test command
sequences to the SOCS to test the ability to operate on stored sequences of
commands.
- "Immediate command" (10.20)
- "Store command sequence, absolute time" (10.21)
- "Store command sequence, relative time" (10.22)
"Start stored sequence", (10.23)
"Stop command sequence" (10.24)
"Delete command sequence" (10.25)
• GSS will issue the following series of state change commands to the SOCS to test
the LVS systems.
"Touchdown" (1.0)
'_tate vector update" (13.0)
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NOTE:
3.2.4
- "Select antenna" (9.1)
"Send Telemetry (TM) Packets" (8.5)
'_I'rans Stdby" (8.8)
'_Record " (15.0)
"Playback" (16.0)
'19oppler Track" (5.5)
"Doppler Stdby" (5.7)
"Altimeter Range" (6.5)
"Altimeter Stdby" (6.7)
- "Star Tracker Track" (14.3)
- "Star Tracker Stdby" (14.4)
GSS will issue the following series of commands to the SOCS to gather status of
all systems. It is assumed that the system is designed such that all status data will
be sent to the GSS over the umbilical by the SDS.
- "Get SDS status" (12.1)
- "Get GN&C status" (12.2)
- "Get C&T status" (12.3)
- "Get Prop status" (12.4)
- "Get Therm status" (12.5)
FSS or GSS will issue the command to "Power off" (10.30) based on health
monitoring
FSS issues command to "Go to Prelaunch Ready Mode" (19.1)
DETAILED COMMANDS FOR THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS AS INDICATED BY
[ ] will be defined during simulation build
PRELAUNCH READY MODE
• F_ issues command to "Go to Launch Mode" (19.2)
3-11
FSS or SOCS issues command to "Go to Interruptive Test Mode" based on health
monitoring if a problem is detected in one of the systems. Based on problem
criticality, a command to "Go to Vehicle Shutdown Mode" may be issued.
3.3 FUGHT UmmON PHASE
Upon completion of the vehicle startup activities, the spacecraft is ready to start its flight
mission. Specific commands can enable or inhibit specific vehicle modes and avionics
states, depending on implementation of the ground rules built into the systems and relay of
ground control commands from the FSS during flight.
The numbers contained in ( ) in the following sections are the number of the command
from the command response tables contained in Section 4.
3.3.1
Note:
LAUNCH MODE COMMANDS
• If a problem is detected prior to launch commit, the GSS or SOCS issues a
command to "Go to Pre]aunch Ready Mode" based on health monitoring.
For CLL, the system is under control of the launch vehicle and no commands are
issued by or for the LVS. All systems are in a wait for command state.
3.3.2 BOOST TO EARTH ORBIT INSERTION MODE COMMANDS
• SOCS issues command to "Activate Attitude Control" (4.1)
• SOCS issues command to "Activate Third Stage Propulsion System" (4.5)
• GN&C issue a command to "Fire Third Stage Propulsion System" (4.6)
• [issue attitude control commands for TLI from GN&C]
• [emergency ground commands from FSS]
ORBIT COAST/TRANSFER MODE COMMANDS
Orbit Transfer to Translunar Coast Fli_aht Commands
• SOCS issues command to "Shutdown Third Stage Propulsion System" (4.7) based
on GN&C calculations.
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• SOCS issues command to "Arm Pyrotechnics (Pyros)" (2.1) based on a timeline
following third stage shutdown
• SOCS issues command to "Fire Pyros" (2.3) based on a timeline to effect third
stage separation
• SOCS issues command to "Go to Orbit Coast Mode " (19.3) following
confirmation of a successful separation.
3.3.3.2 Orbit Coast In Normal Translunar Ri_oht Commands
• [Emergency ground commands and command over rides from FSS]
• FSS issues command to "Update Position" (10.31)
• FSS issues command to "Update Velocity" (10.32)
NOTE: THE FOLLOWING SERIES OF COMMANDS ARE ISSUED BY THE SOCS BASED
ON A TIMELINE FOLLOWING SEPARATION OF THE THIRD STAGE
GN&C directs SOCS to issue a command to "Deploy LVS Legs" (2.4)
SOCS
SOCS
SOCS
SOCS
SOCS Issues
SOCS Lssues
issues command to "Deploy Solar Panels" (2.5)
issues command to "Deploy Antennas" (2.6)
Issues command to "Start Active Ranging" (8.9)
issues command to "End Active Ranging" (8.10)
command to 'Transmit Telemetry" (8.5)
command to "End Transmission of Telemetry" (8.6)
NOTE: THE FOLLOWING SERIES OF COMMANDS ARE CREATED BY CONDITIONS
OR EVENTS AND ARE NOT COMMANDED BY THE TIMELINE
• [GN&C issues commands to propulsion {open and close engine valves} to
maintain proper trajectory and attitude including entering the lunar parking
orbit]
• SOCS issues command "Go to Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Mode" (19.4)
based on health monitoring
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• SOCSissuescommandto "Go to Lunar Orbit Insertion Mode" (19.5) based on
GN&C calculations or on a FSS command.
3.3.3.3 Orbit Coast Mid-course Correction commands
Mid-course corrections during orbit coast may be issued any time during coast.
• FSS issues command to 'lJpdate Position" (10.31)
• FSS issues command to 'rUpdate Velocity" (10.32)
• FSS issues command to "Update Target Attitude" (10.33)
• FSS issues command to 'lJpdate Target Trajectory" (10.34)
• FSS issues command to 'X3pdate Timeline" (10.2)
• [GN&C issues commands to propulsion open and close engine valves} to go to
new attitude and/or trajectory including entering the lunar parking orbit]
3.3.3.4 Orbit Transfer to Lunar Orbit Insertion Commands
NOTE: THE FOLLOWING COMMANDS ARE ISSUED BY SOCS BASED ON A TIMELINE
FOLLOWING LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION
• SOCS issues command to "Start Active Ranging" (8.9)
• SOCS issues command to "End Active Ranging" (8.10)
• SOCS issues command to '_l'ransmit Telemetry" (8.5)
• SOCS issues command to "End Transmission of Telemetry" (8.6)
NOTE: THE FOLLOWING SERIES OF COMMANDS ARE CREATED BY CONDITIONS
OR EVENTS AND ARE NOT COMMANDED BY THE TIMELINE
• [GN&C issues commands to propulsion {open and close engine valves} to enter
the lunar parking orbit]
• FSS or SO_ issues command to "Go to Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation (19.4)
Mode" if a problem is detected by health monitoring
• FSS or SOCS issues command as directed by GN&C to "Go to Deorbit and
Landing Mode" (19.6) ( from SDS normally or from FSS in abnormal situation)
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3.3.3.5 Orbit Coast Follow-up Corrections to Lunar Orbit Commands
While in lunar orbit, follow-up corrections to the orbit coast will be made only if needed.
• FSS issues command to '_pdate Position" (10.31)
• FSS issues command to 'lJpdate Velocity" (10.32)
• FSS issues command to "Update Target Attitude" (10.33)
• FSS issues command to "Update Target Trajectory" (10.34)
• FSS issues command to '_pdate Timeline" (10.2)
• [GN&C issues commands to propulsion {open and close engine valves} to go to
the new attitude and or trajectory to modify the lunar parking orbit]
3.3.4 SPACE MOBILE AND VEHICLE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS MODE COMMANDS
The CLL is an uncrewed spacecraft, with no capability for coordinated space mobility
operations nor for monitoring and controlling proximity operations around the spacecraft.
These modes are not addressed further in this paper.
3.3.5
3.3.5.1
NOTE:
DEORBIT MODE COMMANDS
Lunar Deorbit Reconfi_auration Commands
THE FOLLOWING COMMANDS ARE ISSUED BY SOCS BASED ON A TIMELINE
FOLLOWING THE LUNAR DEORBIT COMMAND (19.6).
• "Turn Altimeter Power On" (6.2)
• [SOCS issues command to "Jettison Unneeded Equipment" (2.7) (whatever needs
to be jettisoned)]
• [SOCS issues commands to reconfigure for landing (whatever else needs to be
done)]
3.3.5.2 powered Descent Initiation Commands
NOTE: THE FOLLOWING SERIES OF COMMANDS ARE CREATED BY CONDITIONS
OR EVENTS AND ARE NOT COMMANDED BY THE TIMELINE
• [GN&C issues commands to propulsion {open and close valves} to maneuver in
attitude to correspond with deorbit burns]
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• GN&C issues command to "Start Altimeter Ranging" (6.5)
• GN&C issues command to "Go to Full Throttle" (4.2) (open engine control
valves for all eight engines for Phase 1 braking)
• [GN&C issues commands to "Go to -15 degrees Pitch Attitude"(for Phase 1
braking)]
• [GN&C issues commands to "Go to 60 degree pitchup to vertical at 1.2 degrees per
second rate" (Phase 2 braking)]
• [GN&C issues commands to reduce throttle by shutting down pairs of engines
every 20 seconds until only two engines are running for 25% of throttle (Phase 2
and Phase 3 braking)]
3.3.6 AUTONOMOUS LANDING MODE COMMANDS
• Landing sensor discrete (1.1) to SOCS from mechanical sensor indicating landing
complete
• SOCS issues commands to for "Engine Off" (4.3) for the remaining two engines
after receiving landing discrete (1.1)
3.4 TERMINAL MISSION PHA_;E
After landing, the spacecraft must be made safe for ground operations and the start of
payload/science mission processing.
3.4.1 POST-LANDING MODE COMMANDS
The following commands must thus be issued:
• SOCS issues command to 'Vent all compressed materials" (4.8)
• SOCS issues command to "Do active ranging" (8.9)
• SOCS issues command to GN&C to "Calculate position" (10.35)
• SOCS issues command to "Transmit telemetry(position and system status)" (8.5)
3.4.2 SHUT-DOWN MODE COMMANDS
• SOCS issues command to "Stop telemetry transmission" after completion (8.6)
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• SOCSissuescommandsto shut down all systems (10.30)
3.4.3 VEHICLE SURFACE PROXIMITY AND MOBILE OPERATIONS
MODE COMMANDS
There was no requirement for surface operations support by the CLL. These modes are not
addressed further in this paper.
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4. SPACECRAFT COMMAND RESPONSE TABLES
The "SGOAA Model Mission Scenario Command Response Table 4-1" contained in this
section was derived from the SGOAA Mission Model Scenario contained in Section 2 of
this document and from Table 3-3 "SDS Functional Interfaces" of [SHU92]. Additional
commands required in addition to those defined in Table 3-3 of [SHU92] are shown in bold
type in Table 4-1. The modes and states described in Section 3.0 and the mission scenario as
described in Section 2 form the basis for the overall sequence of events. System and
subsystem states result from commands generated in response to mode inputs.
In the Table 4-1, the Primary (Pri) Command (CMD) is the initiating or source command
and the secondary (SEC) CMD are those generated by the application software as a result of
the Pri CMD being issued. The software (S/W) responsible for implementing the command
is also shown. Commands initiated on the vehicle are indicated as such by the source being
the Command Processor referred to in this table as SOCS. Commands initiated by ground
control are indicated as such by the source being the GSS prior to launch and the FSS
following launch. Also shown are the expected responses that result from the commands.
4-1
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APPENDIX A
SGOAA DEFINITIONS
Definitions are taken from the POSIX P1003.0 Draft Guide or [LAP90] where applicable or
otherwise established as shown.
Application is defined as in POSIX as the use of capabilities (services/functions) provided by
an information system specific to the satisfaction of a set of user requirements.
Application Platform (AP) is defined as in POSIX as the set of resources that supports the
services on which an application or application software will run. Also known as a host
platform.
Application Program Interface (API) is defined as in POSIX as the interface between the
application software and the application platform, across which all services are provided.
Application Software is defined as in POSIX as software that is specific to an application and
is composed of programs, data and documentation. Application software has uniquely
defined interfaces.
is defined as the structure of Application Software, API, AP, and External
Environment Interfaces (EEIs) which describe the organization and interfaces of a system.
Avionics System is defined for the purpose of this standard as the set of all electronic and
processing based subsystems on a space vehicle, including all hardware, software and other
electronics needed to control and operate the space vehicle. It is the collection of system
elements and allocated capabilities that provides the coordinated functionality for end-to-
end processing in handling the information needed to interface the space vehicle's major
components, to control its interaction with its environment, and to respond to human
commands. (Adapted from [JSC 31000])
Control Subsystem is an application which selects and implements alternative actions based
on a-priori criteria or real time guidance.
is defined as the control subsystems and the supporting avionics (hardware
and software) needed to enable these control subsystems to function. Core avionics include
the controls for each of the traditional space avionics hardware subsystems (such as
Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) and Communications and Tracking (C&T)).
The avionics hardware sensors and effectors are outside the core avionics boundary.
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Data Base Manager (DBM) is the control subsystem which manages structured data files, file
transfers and file redundancy management.
Data Processing Subsystem (DPS) is an application subsystem providing data processing
services. Data processing subsystems do not perform control subsystem functions.
(for example the Space Data System - SDS) is a network of data system services,
onboard computational resources, data storage, and human-machine interface devices
which provide onboard command and control, data transmission, computation/processing,
and operating application software to support a space vehicle's users (crew and controllers),
interfacing systems, applications and subsystems.
Data System Manager (DSM) is the control subsystem which manages the housekeeping
and status control services for the SDSS.
Data System Services (for example the Space Data System Services - SDSS) is a service
subsystem with a generic functional architecture designed to provide a comprehensive set
of services to all vehicles and subsystems.
Degraded mode is a system condition wherein some system elements (such as hardware,
software, human, or procedural) are sufficiently unhealthy that the system cannot operate
normally.
Error is defined as in [LAP90] to be that part of the system state which is liable to lead to
subsequent failure.
F_lure is defined as in [LAP90] as a deviation of the delivered service from the specified
service, where the service specification is an agreed description of the expected function
and/or service.
Fault is defined as in [LAP90] as the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error.
Fault Tolerance is defined as in [LAP90] as providing a service complying with the
specification in spite of faults. Fault tolerance is carried out by error processing and fault
treatment. Error processing is aimed at removing errors from the system state, if possible
before failure occurrence; fault treatment is aimed at preventing faults from being activated
- again.
Fault Treatment is defined as in [LAP90] to be the actions taken in order to prevent a fault
from being re-activated. The first step in fault treatment is fault diagnosis, which consists of
determining the cause(s) of error(s), in terms of both location and nature. This is followed
by fault passivation, which prevents the fault from being activated again. If the system is no
-j
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longer capableof delivering the sameserviceasbefore,then a reconfiguration may take
place.
Flight Critical Function is a function which, if it fails, could cause loss of vehicle control
resulting in loss of the vehicle and, if present, crew.
Function is an action/task that the system must perform to satisfy customer and end user
needs.
Generic Architecture is an architecture where the elements of the architecture do not
depend on any one mission or program for their definition. The elements of a generic
architecture can be tailored to apply to many different missions and programs.
Input/Output Data Services Manager (IOSM) is the interface handling subsystem that
manages the services that process requests for interaction between sensors, effectors,
applications and other services.
Interface is the shared boundary between two functional units, defined by functional and
other physical characteristics, as appropriate.
Mode is a predefined set of hardware and software configurations, and associated
procedures used to organize and manage the conditions of operation for an avionics
system's behavior, as planned, pre-planned or directed by a human.
Network Services Manager (NSM) is a control subsystem which manages peer-to-peer
communication between application software running on distributed processing elements
communicating over a network.
Operating System (OS) is the layer of software that isolates services and application software
from the application platform hardware element. The OS provides services for at least
management, allocation, and deallocation of the processor, memory, timing and
input/output (I/O) processing resources for application and service software.
_ervice delivered by a system is its behavior as it is perceived by its user(s).
Service Subsystem is service software on an application platform, which provides
transparent services to the using control or data processing subsystem.
Software is defined as in POSIX as the programs, procedures, rules, and any associated
documentation pertaining to the operation of a data processing system.
So_ceis the originator of data passed across a logical interface.
Space Data System (SDS) - See Data System definition.
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Space Data System Services (SDSS) - See Data System Services definition.
Space Generic Open Avionics Architecture (SGOAA) is defined as the target open
architecture standard being developed to provide an umbrella set of requirements for
applying a generic architecture interface model to the design of specific avionics
hardware/software systems. This standard defines a generic set of system interface points
and establishes the requirements for applying appropriate low level detailed
implementation standards to those interfaces points. The generic core avionics system and
processing hardware architecture models provided by the standard are robustly tailorable to
specific system applications and provide a platform upon which the generic interface model
is to be applied.
_pace Operations Control System (SOCS) is the high level integrating command and control
functional entity for a space vehicle and mission. SOCS functions may be allocated to both
ground mission control facilities and onboard space vehicle facilities. SOCS functions
replace all crew controlled functions for an unmanned vehicle.
Standard Data Services Manager (SDSM) is the interface handling subsystem that manages
the services that process requests for interaction between sensors, effectors, application
software and other services.
Standard is a document established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that
provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines, or characteristics for activities or
their results, aimed at the achievement of the maximum degree of order in a given context.
S_te is a set of hardware and software configurations which identify the intervening or
instantaneous organization and constraints on the condition of operation for an avionics
subsystem's behavior, resulting from mode commands as established by the system.
is defined as in [SYSB-1] as the composite of equipment, material, computer
software, personnel, facilities and information/procedural data that satisfies a user need.
System Services Software is common software, independent of application software, which
is needed to run application software and enable it to interface to data within a system or
across the EEI. This is similar to the POSIX entity, system software, which is defined as the
application independent software that supports the running of application software.
Task is defined as a software entity that is executed in parallel with other parts of a software
program to perform an action. [BOOCH87]
User is another system (human or physical) which interacts with the target system.
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ARTEMIS COMMON LUNAR LANDER VEHICLE SUMMARY
The purpose of the Artemis Program was to gather vital scientific and engineering data by
conducting robotics exploration missions on the lunar surface both prior to and concurrent
with human exploration missions. It included rapid, near-term development of small
experimental and operational payloads, a low-cost capability to deliver these payloads to any
location on the lunar surface, and an analysis of the data returned. The conceptual flight
profile for the Artemis is contained in [KIL92].
The Artemis Program consisted of two segments, a transportation segment and a payload
segment. The transportation segment consists of Launch Services and a Artemis Lander
System. In the Artemis Lander System there are three systems: They are the Lander Vehicle
System (LVS), the Ground Support System(GSS) and the Flight Support System (FSS). This
scenario will primarily address the LVS, but will also include those commands issued to the
LVS from the GSS during pre-launch activities and from the FSS after launch. A functional
block diagram of the FSS is shown in Figure B-1.
B.1 LANDER VEHI(_LE SYSTEM
The LVS is the spacecraft which carries the Artemis Payload to a soft landing on the lunar
surface. LVS functions include providing a simple structural interface for the Artemis
Payload, providing an interface to the launch vehicle, and performing all in-transit
functions on the way to the Moon. The LVS provides a controlled, soft landing on the
lunar surface and provides an inert platform from which the payload can operate. The
Lander does not provide any Avionics support functions to the payloads. The LVS
automatically configures itself for flight and automatically executes all flight functions
under the supervision of the FSS. The LVS periodically receives ground-computed
position updates and will use onboard attitude updates to compute its state vector and
perform targeting and burn execution functions.
The Lander consists of several subtier elements. These elements consist of avionics,
structure, mechanisms, thermal control, propulsion and power. This report focuses on the
SDS contained within the avionics element. [SHU92] is the Artemis final report on the
avionics element. The avionics element is responsible for functions of the LVS which
require electronics including digital equipment and software. This element handles active
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ranging, telemetry, transmission ,command receipt and processing and other
communications related functions. It also handles data management functions such as
system monitoring, telemetry stream development, event sequence monitoring, and
subsystem command generation. As shown in Figure B-l, the avionics element is
partitioned into the SDS, GN&C, C&T, Propulsion System (Prop), Power System(Pwr) along
with associated software. The CLL has no active Environmental Control and Life Support
System (ELS) and no interface to payloads. The Command Processor issues all commands
to the ELS. Figure B-2 from the SGOAA Standard [WS94] defines the SGOAA Class 4D
Space Data System Services (SDSS) Software to Applications Software Direct Interfaces. The
avionics element subsystem functions are discussed below:
• SDS as defined in [WS94] is a network of Data System Services (data system
software), onboard computational resources, data storage, and human-machine
interface devices which provide onboard command and control, data
transmission, computation/processing, and operating of application software to
support a space vehicle's users (crew and controllers), interfacing systems,
applications and subsystems.
• Space Data System Services (SDSS) consists of standard data services
management (SDSM), network services management (NSM), data base
management (DBM), data system management (DSM), and an operating system
(OS). The functions performed by each of these services is as follows:
The Input/Output Data Services Manager (IOSM) provides all interface to the
system users for data processing and data communication services including
data acquisition, standard services data distribution and reports generation.
- The Common Lunar Lander does not require a Network Services Manager
NSM) as it is a centralized processing system. Communication between the
SDS and Other Avionics is via a 1553B Local Bus. The driver software for the
1553B is considered in SGOAA to be an extension of the Operating System
software.
- The Data Base Manager (DBM) is the service which manages storage and
retrieval of data.
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- The Data System Manager (DSM) is the service which manages the
housekeeping (configuration management) and status control services for
the SDS. Fault management services provided include built-in test
management, error detection, reporting and recovery functions for the SDS
operational environment and a dump utility for communicating error by
telemetry to the FSS.
- The Operating System (OS) is the layer of software that isolates services and
application software from the application platform hardware element. The
OS provides services for at least management, allocation, and deallocation of
the processor, memory, timing and input/output (I/O) processing resources
for application and service software. An Ada Run Time Environment is
provided.
GN&C applications software includes guidance functions such as maneuver
targeting calculations and maneuver plan updates, and navigation functions for
propagating inertial state vectors, processing state vector updates, and for
determining vehicle attitude. Control functions for controlling spacecraft
attitude and velocity by commanding thruster firings are also GN&C functions.
Valve Controller Driver Software is included in the GN&C application software.
GN&C hardware consists of the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), and Star
Tracker. GN&C provides direct commands to the propulsion hardware by way of
the Valve Controller Driver.
C&T application software is provided to handle telemetry formatting and active
ranging. C&T Tracking hardware is provided for directly determining lunar
altitude and velocity upon request from GN&C. C&T hardware consists of the
Doppler Radar, Radar Altimeter and a Transponder. The transponder provides
for telemetry transmission and active ranging with the NASA Deep Space
Network (DSN).
Electrical Power System (EPS) application software is provided to control the EPS.
The EPS hardware consists of the batteries, solar panels, power distribution
switches, and power conditioning modules. The power element is responsible
for electrical power generation, power distribution, and electrical noise
suppression.
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• The Command Processor applications software is equivalent to the SGOAA Space
Operations Control Subsystem (SOCS) software. This software is the high level
integrating and control functional entity for the space vehicle.
• The Propulsion System applications software is provided to control the
Propulsion System. This systems hardware consists of the fuel tanks, fuel lines,
valves to control fuel flow and the thruster engines. The Lander Vehicle
propulsion element is responsible for providing the thrust indicated for state
vector modifications and for providing the thrust needed in attitude
maintenance.
• The Thermal System has no application software. The heaters can be turned on
and off by the Command Processor software and are then controlled by built-in
thermocouples. The Thermal Control System controls the temperatures of the
various vehicle hardware. The Thermal Control System is a subset of the
Environmental and Life Support (ELS) system shown in Figure B-2.
• The structural element provides the physical support for other lander systems,
structural interface to the payload, and interface to the launch vehicle.
• Lander mechanisms perform derived functions such as those needed to deploy
items such as landing legs and solar arrays.
B.2 INTERFACE DEFINITIONS
B.2.1 EXTERNAL COMMAND INTERFACES
External to the LVS is the Lander Vehicle's interface with the launch vehicle. The primary
interface with the launch vehicle is structural. There may also be electrical interfaces for
event triggers such as stage burnout's and separations.
Also external to the LVS is the Lander Vehicles interface to the Payload Segment. The
Lander provides a simple structural interface to the payload and an electrostatic discharge
path from the Lander to the surface.
The Lander Vehicle does not include operational support functions. For this function, the
system has external interfaces with the FSS and the GSS. The FSS provides the vehicle with
flight operations support for navigation updates and for system configuration monitoring
and control when needed. The GSS provides the Lander Vehicle with its preparations for
B-6
launch including transportation, testing, storage,handling, maintenanceand servicing.
The Avionics Subsystemor elementprovides the external interfaces for the data flow
between the Lander Vehicle and the GSS and FSS.
B.2.2 INTERNAL COMMAND INTERFACES
The following discussion with regard to interfaces is limited to electronic interfaces between
the Avionics and the other Lander subsystems. The Avionics Subsystem collects health and
status data, collects development flight instrumentation data and distributes commands
throughout all operational modes to all LVS Subsystems. Specific command functions
performed by the Command Processor are:
• Issue commands to control power on and power off of the vehicle.
• Automatically provide for the selection and transition between vehicle modes.
• Accept and issue commands to all onboard systems and modify onboard data
bases as directed by the GSS and the FSS.
• Issue commands to transmit telemetry.
GN&C functional software issues commands to the vehicle's rotation and translation
effectors as required to execute maneuvers.
B-7
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APPENDIX C
MODES AND STATES IN MISSIONS AND VEHICLES
The following paragraphs contain short descriptions of the modes and states as extracted
from [STA92] and modified to conform to [DW93]. Where [STA92] and [DW93] names differ
the [STA92] name is shown in parenthesis.
Four types of mode and state models were defined:
• A Mission Mode model governing mission element behavior as shown in Figure
C-1. The Mission Modes addressed in this paper are based in part on the CLL and
are: Pre-launch, Launch, Boost, Orbit Coast, Deorbit, Landing, and Post-Landing
including Shutdown.
• A Vehicle Mode model governing internal vehicle behavior is also shown in
Figure C-1.
• A Subsystem State model identifying potential subsystem element behavior, with
the Avionics Subsystem used as an example is shown in Figure C-2. Note that
the action of any specific avionics subsystem state may vary depending upon
which modes are in effect at the time the state is entered.
• A Function State Model identifying potential functional element behavior, with
the Space Data System Services (SDSS) is used as an example in Figure C-2.
Not all possible combinations of mission and vehicle modes, and avionics subsystem and
SDSS function states are allowed. The following subsections identify allowable
combinations of modes and states.
C.1 PRE-FLIGHT MISSION PHASE MODES AND STATES ALLOWED
C.1.1 MODES ALLOWED IN THE PRE-LAUNCH MISSION PHASE
The Pre-Flight Mission Phase consists of the Pre-Launch Mission Mode as shown in Figure
C-3. It includes all applicable vehicle modes up to launch. They are the Vehicle Off (Power
Off), Vehicle Initialization, Integrated System (End to End) Test, Vehicle Shutdown and the
Standby vehicle modes.
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• Vehicle Off Vehicle Mode is the configuration in which the vehicle does not
have power applied and is inert. The vehicle transitions out of this mode only
into the Vehicle Initialization Vehicle Mode and can only be put in this mode
from the Vehicle Shutdown Mode. A power up command causes the spacecraft
to enter the Vehicle Initialization Mode. A power down command causes the
spacecraft to enter the Shut-Down and then Vehicle Off modes sequentially.
• Vchi¢l_ Initialization Vehicle Mode is the mode that implements the startup
process. This mode ensures that the flight vehicle systems are started up in the
proper sequence. As a part of the initialization process,, each hardware item
performs Power On Self Test (POST) and reports the results to the SDSS DSM. If
failures are detected, the vehicle will be put into either the Integrated System
Test, Standby or the Vehicle Shutdown Mode depending upon the failure(s)
encountered.
• Integrated System Test Vehicle Mode is the mode used during prelaunch
processing and in which the vehicle can perform health and status checks and be
monitored and queried. This mode provides for primary processing to perform
end-to-end system tests. There may be special test programs and equipment
installed to support this testing. At the conclusion of the testing, the vehicle's
systems should be purged of any special test data and code (to preclude impact on
subsequent vehicle operations). From this mode the vehicle can enter the
Vehicle Shut-down Mode upon a command, the Standby Mode upon command,
or the Vehicle Initialization Mode upon a command to reset or complete vehicle
systems initialization from the GSS.
• Vehicle Shut-Down Vehicle Mode is the mode where the vehicle is prepared for
a safe shutdown; with backing up of any needed data bases, completion of
diagnostic storage and implementation of the proper shutdown sequence for the
various subsystems. From this mode only the Vehicle Off mode can be entered.
• Standby Vehicle Mode is the mode where the vehicle is configured and awaiting
further commands with power usage and vehicle activity. This is a normal
vehicle mode for use in the Pre-Launch Mission Mode. In this mode, final
software loads have been made, the vehicle has performed health and status
monitoring and is ready to accept commands. Key subsystems may be operating,
such as communications, antenna pointing,, and continuous built-in test to
ensure systems continue to function. Most subsystems will be operating at low
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power and ready for usebut not active,suchasradar'sand transmitters ready and
able to be engaged upon command. From this mode the vehicle can only
transition back to Vehicle Initialization, Integrated System Test or Vehicle Shut-
Down Vehicle Modes upon command. When the mission mode transitions into
the Launch Mission Mode, then the Normal Operation Vehicle Mode and others
become available for activation upon command from the GSS.
C.1.2 STATES ALLOWED IN PRE-LAUNCH MISSION MODE
In the Pre-Launch Mission Mode which begins with the vehicle installed on the launch pad
and declared ready to be checked out and prepared for launch, the vehicle modes which can
be utilized are Vehicle Off, Vehicle Initialization, Integrated System Test, Vehicle Shut-
Down, Standby and Periodic Maintenance. Normal Operation, Vehicle Training and
Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Modes are not available in the Pre-Launch Mission Mode.
In the Integrated System Test Mode, the primary mode for the Pre-Launch Mission Mode,
many of the same SDS functions are performed as in the Normal Operations Mode, but
safeguards are in place to prevent unsafe or harmful system operation. Vehicle Training
Mode is not appropriate during the checkout of a vehicle for launch. A failure in a vehicle
system will initiate either a shutdown or continuation in the test mode and not a mode
change to Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation as there is no mission threat during prelaunch
checkout. The following subsections identify the avionics subsystem states allowable in
each of these vehicle modes.
C.1.2.1 States for Vehicle Off Vehi¢l(_ Mode
When the Vehicle Off Vehicle Mode is in effect, the only applicable avionics state is
ALL_OFF, as shown in Figure C-4. The entry and exit conditions for this state are described
below.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State Exit. In this state, no power is applied to any
avionics subsystem while in the Pre-Launch Mission Mode. External power or
special battery operated non-avionics capability (such as a timer or external
command operated switch) is needed to take the vehicle out of the Vehicle Off
Vehicle Mode. When such power is applied (with the power on command), the
vehicle mode changes, thus allowing the avionics state to change. When the
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Vehicle Off Vehicle Mode changes to the Vehicle Initialization Vehicle Mode,
additional avionics states are allowed as described below.
ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State Entry. Entry into this state cannot be
achieved by the avionics commanding themselves to totally shut-down and
power off. After all non-SDSS avionics are shut-down, then a transition to the
Vehicle Off Vehicle Mode can be externally achieved, however. In such a
Vehicle Mode transition while in START_SDSS, an external power off
command signal can be activated, causing the spacecraft to be fully powered
down. The lack of an arrow representing a transition into ALL_OFF indicates
this can only be achieved by external control, not system control. While in this
state (if in the Vehicle Off Vehicle Mode) in the Pre-Launch Mission Mode, all
avionics are cold, with no power applied at all.
C.1.2.2 States for Vehicle Initialization Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle Initialization Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics subsystem states
shown in Figure C-5 (in black and white) may be entered in the Pre-Launch Mission Mode.
These states are described below.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. When the spacecraft first switches from the
Vehicle Off to Vehicle Initialization Vehicle Modes, it starts off in the ALL OFF
Avionics Subsystem State. The power on command is applied with external or
other power (as noted above) to cause the vehicle mode to switch and the
ALL_OFF state to be exited.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. The first activity that takes place after
powering up the avionics is for the START_SDSS Avionics State to be entered to
boot up the avionics processing capabilities. This state causes the data system
boot loader to execute, which starts up the data system services, the command
processor and the external avionics and their associated software. This state
includes the power-on self test (POST) required for the SDSS to load and
function. This state also allows for return after the avionics have been shut
down, with just the SDSS running and ready to re-configure or re-initialize the
avionics. Note that the SDSS is inhibited from transitioning itself to the
ALL_OFF avionics state, as a safety precaution. Only an external power line or
other external-to-SDSS power switch (similar to the ALL OFF exit signal) can
cause the SDSS to power down.
C-8
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• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. After the avionics are started,
then the AV_CONFIG & INIT Avionics State is entered to setup the avionics
for operation. This state both establishes the configuration of components,
priorities, services, information and operating parameters needed for the
avionics to function. It then initializes the avionics with their startup data
needed for operation. Startup errors are processed and both pre-stored and real-
time user setup commands are implemented. This state includes the POST
required for the other avionics to load and function.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. After the avionics have
initialized and are ready for operation, they must enter the
AV_SUBSYS_STANDBY state to ensure that all subsystems data and timing are
synchronized, and stay so after any subsystem changes which may be
subsequently directed. This state is a holding state while other major state
changes are contemplated. While in this state, no general avionics activities may
be carried out that are not needed, so the system can remain quiescent and ready
to implement subsequent mode commands. This state includes the continuous
built-in test (CBIT) and fault detection, isolation and recovery (FDIR) needed to
ensure the avionics are functioning sufficiently to carry out any mode commands
which may be received.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. When the crew or GSS so command,
manual parameters and switches may be set by crew or GSS members. If so, then
the MANUAL_OP state ensures that automatic processes do not work against the
actions being manually carried out, and that the system monitors manual actions
to maintain cognizance of their state and results. Manual control actions always
have priority over other system functions. Potentially hazardous manual actions
will cause an alert or caution to the crew and GSS.
• INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. While the vehicle is
initializing, if it is necessary to resolve errors or problems with testing which is
more extensive than POST, then interruptive test may be directed. This state
causes tests to be performed on the system or subsystem elements which can
interfere with their normal functioning. For instance, special input data that
produces known results with normal system operation may be inserted and the
actual results and predefined (known) results compared to verify normal system
operation. Special test diagnostics may also be executed which make the element
unavailable for normal processing until tests are completed. After interruptive
C-10
testing is completed, it is necessary to either return to AV_INIT & CONFIG for
re-initialization, or to AV_SHUT-DOWN for termination of processing and
avionics operation.
AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. When this state is
entered by a command to shut-down the avionics, avionics system elements will
be shut down and power removed in an orderly manner to preserve all data,
ensure processes do not execute uncontrollably, and that external avionics power
is also terminated in the proper manner with controlling software. When this
state is entered by a command to shut-down a specific avionics subsystem, then
just those elements will be powered down, with the exception of the SDSS. The
SDSS can be cold re-started as long as the power line to re-start it remains on; it
cannot be powered down from within the system as a safety precaution as noted
above. From this state, the only state that can follow is the START_SDSS state in
which the data system continues operating and ready to re-configure or re-
initialize the avionics if necessary.
C.1.2.3 States for Standby Vehicle Mode
When the Standby Vehicle Mode is in effect, avionics states as shown in Figure C-6 may be
entered in the Pre-Launch Mission Mode. These states are described below.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. Although the vehicle is in the Standby
Vehicle Mode, there may be some avionics subsystems which are still powered
down (for instance backup or spare processing units). Thus, the potential usage
of avionics subsystem states starts with the ALL_OFF state. The exit transition in
this case would be caused by the SDSS or other avionics function generating a
power on command to the component or subsystem which needs to be activated.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. When a processing resource is added
to the roster of operating SDSS components while the vehicle is in the Standby
Vehicle Mode, the START_SDSS state ensures the component boots up with the
appropriate service changes to enable its use. This includes performing a POST
on the component, downloading the software needed for the component, setting
up the appropriate communications and access services, etc. While the
START_SDSS generally cannot transition to an ALLOW state, specific
components that have been powered down can be rebooted (for instance to
perform a "cold" start) to improve system operability.
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• AV CONHG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. After a new processing
resource has been started, then this state is re-entered for that component to
configure and initialize it as was previously done for the Vehicle Initialization
Mode in Section C.1.2.2. If external components are being brought on-line to
support a SDSS component, and they require a POST, then this state would
ensure it was performed with acceptable results.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state is the normal
state for most components while the Standby Vehicle Mode is in effect. CBIT,
FDIR and routine housekeeping SDSS processes will operate normally as noted
in Section C.1.2.2. Communications; guidance navigation and control; and
command processing subsystems may operate intermittently for station-keeping
or as required by mission parameters.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. While the avionics are generally in a
holding state, manual control of the system is always capable of being executed by
the crew or GSS.
• AV SUBSYS SHUTDOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state may be
entered by a power off command for a specific component while in the Standby
Vehicle Mode, either to turn it off (for instance to save power) or to force a re-
start on the component (for instance to recover a failed or "confused" subsystem).
C.1.2.4 _;|ates for Inte0rated System Test Vehicle Mode
When the Integrated System (End-to-End) Test Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics
subsystem states shown in Figure C-7 (in black and white) may be entered in the Pre-Launch
Mission Mode. These states are described below.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. When the vehicle enters into the
Integrated System Test Vehicle Mode, activation of specific test equipment may
be needed. Entry into this vehicle mode will be accompanied by a test equipment
power on command which identifies any special test equipment which is needed.
That equipment would be powered on and cause a transition to the
START_SDSS state.
• _;TART SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. In this state in this vehicle mode, the
test equipment newly powered on will perform a POST of processing
components to be used, any special test software needed will be downloaded, and
C-13
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other special communications needed for test processing will be made available.
Specific test equipment or processors which may need to be re-started can also
pass through this state to improve system operability.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state causes the external
test equipment to be powered on, POST is performed on them, test applications
are downloaded, the test subsystems are configured and initialized for operation
(as described for this state in C.1.2.2. Special test-instrumented versions of
applications or services may be commanded to be loaded, configured and
initialized as needed to meet test requirements.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state causes the test
subsystems to become quiescent until explicitly commanded to carry out specific
directed actions, similar to this states activities in C.1.2.2.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. Manually controlled test
instrumentation and system under test are commanded in this state. Test cases
and procedures can be manually implemented. Test data can be manually
injected into the system and tracked.
• COMPUTER-AIDED OPERATION Avionics Subsystem State. Entry of this state
is normally from the MANUAL_OP or AV_SUBSYS_STANDBY states. Upon
entry, fully automatic operation of the test systems and the avionics systems are
executed. Automatic test operations cease when either commanded, time-out is
reached, or specific exit conditions are encountered.
• INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. This state sets up the specific
tests to be executed and data to be recorded for the Integrated System Test Vehicle
Mode. Any "quick-look" test results needed are identified and commanded to be
processed. Any real-time data analysis requirements are identified and
commanded to be processed. Special test-instrumentation parameters in
applications or services may be accessed, results stored or analyzed, and reports
generated.
• AV SUBSYS MAINTENANCE Avionics Subsystem State. Normal entry into
this state is either from the AV_CONFIG & INIT or INTERRUPTIVE TEST
states. This state allows special maintenance programs to be executed in
conjunction with testing to improve test operations, verify test processes,
validate test results and aid system repair operations. Exit from this state is upon
C-15
commandor encounteringof specific exit conditions. Upon exit, any
maintenancecapabilitiesare reset to normal avionicsstates.
AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state is entered by
a command to shut-down the test capability for the system under test, and reset
avionics system under test to normal avionics states. Thus the only exit from
this state is to re-enter the START__SDSS state, where the systems can be "cold-
started" to ensure proper loading, configuration and initialization of the avionics
with just the appropriate operational data. All test and maintenance data must
be effectively purged from the system.
C.1.2.5 States for Vehicle Shut-Down Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle Shut-Down Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics subsystem states
shown in Figure C-8 (in black and white) may be entered in the Pre-Launch Mission Mode.
Vehicle Shut-Down mode may be preparatory to either turning the vehicle to the Vehicle
Off mode or to the Vehicle Initialization mode (for instance, to re-initialize vehicle
subsystems). These states are described below.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. In this state, the vehicle avionics
subsystems are manually switched off by sending commands to each subsystem to
stop all activity and then sending a power off command to the power subsystem
to power down each other subsystem.
• COMPUTER AIDED OP Avionics Subsystem State. In this state, a shut-down
automated program is executed which turns each subsystem off, commands it be
powered down, and powers down itself last. This causes a transition to the
AV_SUBSYS_SHUT-DOWN state.
• AV $UBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. In this state, all
avionics except for the SDSS are confirmed to be turned off and powered down.
All external hardware subsystems are powered down, and all service peripherals
are powered down. The SDSS cannot power itself down as noted above as a
safety precaution. In transitioning to the Vehicle Off Mode, an external power off
signal can be sent to the power subsystem to remove power from the SDSS and
from the power subsystem.
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C.1.2.6 _;tates for Periodic Maintenance Vehicle Mode
When the Periodic Maintenance Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics states shown in
Figure C-9 (in black and white) may be entered in the Pre-Launch Mission Mode. Periodic
maintenance is required when component anomalies or failures have occurred during test
and checkout of the vehicle prior to launch. The states are described below.
• _LL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides control over the special
maintenance subsystems which start out in the ALLOW state. Upon command
to enter Periodic Maintenance Vehicle Mode, the SOCS will issue the power on
command for the maintenance subsystem and ancillary equipment.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls for starting
service connections with the maintenance subsystems. This includes performing
POST on the maintenance equipment and loading special maintenance software.
This state also provides for cold restart of the avionics after maintenance mode if
needed to purge maintenance data from the system.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls
for configuring and initializing (or re-initializing) components being started.
Selection of equipment to be used for maintenance or to undergo maintenance is
part of the configuration process. It includes setup up controls to ensure the
maintenance subsystem can be unambiguously overridden by actual alerts and
warnings if needed. It also includes loading and unloading special maintenance
versions of operational flight programs if needed.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls
over the maintenance equipment when it must be placed in a quiescent
condition while higher priority tasks interrupt, but termination of the
maintenance activities or the current maintenance examination is not desired.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls to enable
the actual avionics systems not in maintenance mode to monitor human actions
in maintenance and in non-maintenance operations, keep them separate and to
support both sets of actions.
• AV SUBSYS MAINTENANCE Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides
controls for the maintenance equipment and programs which will be used. It is
the normal state for this mode. Maintenance subsystems might include such
capabilities as simulations to represent the appearance of mission system
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interfacesand their behavior, emulation's of real environmental conditions not
currently available to crew operations, and interfaces to real avionics subsystems
to enable their use in stimulating avionics being maintained. Entry into this
state would be by execution of the Start Periodic Maintenance Mode command.
Exit from this state would be caused by the End Maintenance Mode or End
AV_SUBSYS_MAINTENANCE State commands, and result in transition to the
AV_SUBSYS_SHUT-DOWN state.
INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls
for special maintenance tests needed. (It is presumed that many of these tests will
interfere with normal avionics processing capability, which is acceptable in
maintenance mode). It also provides for injection of special maintenance data
(e.g., data with known results) into input ports on sensors and other devices.
AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides
controls to shut-down maintenance subsystems in an orderly manner. It
provides for the orderly shut-down (and eventual restart) of avionics which may
have been repaired or need to purge confused state conditions.
C.2 FLIGHT MISSION PHASE MODES AND STATE_; ALLOWED
The Flight Mission Phase includes those mission modes where the vehicle is in free space
flight, or is still connected to elements of the launch vehicle in free flight and is itself
preparing for free flight.
C.2.1 MODES ALLOWED IN THE FLIGHT MISSION PHASE
The mission modes in this mission phase are Launch Mission Mode, Boost Mission Mode,
Orbit Coast/Transfer Mission Mode (Normal Flight), Deorbit Mission Mode and Landing
Mission Mode. During each of these mission modes, the vehicle can be put into the vehicle
modes identified below within each mission mode. (The Vehicle Proximity Operations
and Space Mobile Operations modes are not addressed in this scenario.)
C.2.1.1 Launch MIsslon MoCQ
This mode is shown in Figure C-10 beginning at the end of prelaunch countdown and
continuing through translunar injection (TLI). In this mode and prior to launch the
vehicle still transmits data to and receive commands from the GSS. All connections to the
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GSS are terminated at launch. This mode can only be entered from the Prelaunch Ready
Vehicle Mode. Prior to launch, the vehicle can transition from Launch Mission Mode back
into the Prelaunch Mission Mode upon command from the GSS. During launch and boost
the vehicle will be in either Vehicle Normal Operation, Safe/Degraded Operation, Shut-
down or Off modes.
C.2.1.2 Boost Mlsslon Mode
This mode is shown in Figure C-11 and is the mode in which the spacecraft has left the
launch pad and is rising under programmed control. This boost mode ends in orbital
insertion. After boost mode, the vehicle can enter the Orbit Coast/Transfer, Deorbit or
Landing Mission Modes.
C.2.1.3 Orbit Coast/Transfer Mission Mode
This mode is shown in figure C-12 and is the mode in which normal flight operations
occur. After boost to orbital insertion, orbital transfer to another orbital trajectory or to
translunar injection (TLI) can take place. Prior to TLI, the SOCS will issue commands to
enter the TLI configuration which includes activation of the attitude control capability for
the combined LVS and launch vehicle third stage, activation of the third stage propulsion
system for the TLI burn and leg deployment. Following TLI, the SOCS will issue commands
to separate from the launch vehicle and enter the Coast Mode. The vehicle is self-sufficient
in this state and will only receive position and velocity state vector updates and emergency
commands from the FSS. The SDS will perform all calculations and issue all commands
necessary to complete the mission. These SDS issued commands will as a minimum
include solar panel and antenna deployment, active ranging, commands to propulsion for
thrust and attitude control to maintain the proper trajectory including entering the lunar
parking orbit, and communicate telemetry. The FSS monitors and can send override and
update commands. If an unrecoverable onboard failure is encountered, the SOCS will put
the vehicle in the Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle Mode (Contingency Hold
Mode) also shown in Figure C-12 and await commands from the FSS. From the Orbit Cost
Mission Mode, the vehicle can only enter the Deorbit and Landing Mission Modes. The
SOCS issues the commands necessary to transition into the Deorbit and Landing Mission
Mode just prior to the lunar deorbit maneuver.
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C.2.1.4 Deorblt Mission Mode
This mode is shown in Figure C-13. This mission mode can be commanded from the
modes shown by the arrows in order to effect departure from orbit, with the objective of
returning to the surface. Prior to orbit departure, the SOCS will issue commands to insert
the spacecraft into a Lunar re-entry trajectory, which includes activation of the appropriate
attitude controls, positioning the spacecraft for re-entry, and firing the engines. Following
re-entry, the SOCS issues commands to activate landing radar, activates appropriate
communications and location signals, and prepares the spacecraft as needed. These
commands will as a minimum include solar panel and antenna adjustment ejection (as
needed), active ranging, commands to propulsion for thrust and attitude control to
maintain the proper trajectory to reach the terminal area and/or landing site, and
communicate telemetry. The FSS monitors and can send override and update commands.
If an unrecoverable onboard failure is encountered, the SOCS will put the vehicle in the
Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle Mode and execute pre-stored
emergency contingency alternatives. Deorbit mode ends when the spacecraft reaches the
terminal area and begins to maneuver and prepare for touchdown. While FSS override can
always be executed, there may not be sufficient time during this mode for safe
implementation of real-time FSS commands; thus, pre-stored contingency commands must
be available in the SOCq.
C.2.1.5 I-_ndina Mission Mode
This mode is shown in Figure C-14. This mission mode can be commanded from the
modes shown by the arrows in order to touch down on the surface. Prior to touch down,
the SOCS will issue commands to prepare the spacecraft for a safe surface touch down,
which includes activation of the appropriate attitude controls, positioning the spacecraft for
touch down, and firing the engines. It also includes ranging on the landing site to assure
appropriate and safe site terminal guidance can be effected. FoUowing touch down, the
SOCS issues commands to turn off and safe the engines, send the touch down telemetry and
shut-down the avionics. These commands will as a minimum include solar panel and
antenna deployment/adjustment (as needed), active ranging, commands to propulsion for
thrust and attitude control to maintain the proper trajectory including touch down on the
landing site, and communicate telemetry. The FSS monitors and can send override and
update commands. If an unrecoverable onboard failure is encountered, the SOCS will put
the vehicle in the Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle Mode and execute pre-stored
emergency/contingency alternatives. While FSS override can always be executed, there may
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not be sufficient time during this mode for safe implementation of real-time FSS
commands; thus, pre-stored contingency commands must be available in the SOCS.
C.2.2 STATES ALLOWED IN LAUNCH MISSION MODE
In the Launch Mission Mode, vehicle modes which can be utilized are Normal Operation,
Vehicle Safe/Degrade Operation, Vehicle Shut-Down and Vehicle Off, as previously shown
in Figure C-10. The other vehicle modes are not available because they could possibly allow
hazardous operations to be carried out (for instance by transitioning to shut-down mode
during launch after lift-off) or do not make sense (for instance using training mode during
the busy launch period). The following subsections identify the avionics subsystem states
allowable in each of these vehicle modes.
C.2.2.1 States for Standby Vehicle Mode
When the Standby Vehicle Mode is in effect, avionics states as previously shown in Figure
C-6 may be entered in the Launch Mission Mode. This mode provides for vehicle behavior
during the countdown before the computer systems are activated to control operations.
These states are described below.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. Although the vehicle is in the Standby
Vehicle Mode, there may be some avionics subsystems which are still powered
down awaiting activation. The exit transition in this case would be caused by the
SDSS or GSS generating a power on command to the component or subsystem
which needs to be activated.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. When a processing resource is added
to the roster of operating SDSS components during the launch countdown, while
the vehicle is in the Standby Vehicle Mode, the START_SDSS state ensures the
component boots up as described in Section C.1.2.3.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State, After a new processing
resource has been started during the countdown, this state configures and
initializes it as was previously done for the Vehicle Initialization Mode in
Section C.1.2.2 and described in Section C.1.2.3.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state is the normal
state for most components while the Standby Vehicle Mode is in effect prior to
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entering the COMPUTER AIDED OPERATION Avionics Subsystem State during
the countdown, similar to the description in Section C.1.2.3.
MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. While the avionics are generally in a
holding state, manual control of the system is always capable of being executed by
the crew or GSS.
AV SUBSYS SHUTDOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state may be
entered by a power off command for a specific component while in the Standby
Vehicle Mode, either to turn it off (for instance to save power) or to force a re-
start on the component (for instance to recover a failed or "confused" subsystem).
C.2.2.2 States for Normal OE)eration Vehicle Mode
When the Normal Operation Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics states shown in Figure
C-15 (in black and white) may be entered in the Launch Mission Mode. These states are
described below.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. While in Launch, Normal Operation
mode, some of the avionics subsystems not immediately needed may be in the
ALL_OFF state. Such resources are available if needed for backup and spares
purposes. If a hot (i.e., currently running) backup running in standby state were
to be selected for primary operation due to a failure, then a cold (i.e., not currently
running and off) backup could be needed to be brought on-line to act as a new hot
backup.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. When a failure of a primary
component requires either the hot backup become a primary resource or if there
is no hot backup, then activation of cold spares may be needed. Such activation
would require the data system to be booted on the processor, and the remaining
data system components to be made aware of the "new" existence of such a
component. This state includes commanding the power subsystem to apply
power to the component, component response to the application of power, the
POST of the component as it is powered up, and loading any related component
data system software. This state also provides for cold restart after avionics shut-
down, with just the SDSS boot routine running to re-boot the SDSS.
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• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. When new components are
brought on-line during launch operations, this state establishes the configuration
and initializes (or re-initializes) the components being started. Any external
avionics needed to support the newly initialized or re-initialized component are
POSTed and errors are handled.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. After new components
have been initialized, they transition to standby to await direction for use, or to
serve as hot backups as needed. Standby provides for the synchronization of data
and timing, with CBIT and FDIR to keep a functional capability.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. In Launch, Normal Operation mode,
it is assumed operations are automated. However, if necessary for human
intervention, then this state provides for the system to monitor human actions
to enable the system to operate in support of such actions.
• (_OMPUTER-AIDED OPERATION Avionics Subsystem State. This is the
normal state for Launch mode operations. Entry takes place upon transition
from the Pre-Launch Mission Mode to the Launch Mission Mode; the mission
mode transition command, Start Launch Mission Mode, causes entry into the
COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION state. Upon entry, fully automated launch
operations begin and/or are supported from countdown start to through systems
checks to engine ignition. (As the mission transitions from Launch Mission
Mode to Boost Mission Mode at engine ignition, the avionics state remains in
COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION.) Exit from this state in Launch Mission
Mode occurs when a failure is identified and continuance of the mission is
needed, requiring a switch to the AVIONICS_SAFE/DEGRADED_OPN state.
Otherwise, the avionics may be commanded to change states to delay the
countdown while interruptive tests, shut-down procedures, or re-
configuration/re-initialization takes place. Standby may be directed to otherwise
delay the countdown for non-avionics concerns. Of course, MANUAL_OP state
override is always available.
• AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN Avionics Subsystem State. While the
vehicle is in the Launch Mission Mode (countdown is running), a failure may
occur necessitating a decision on whether to continue to launch with the failure
(that is, this usually means one less backup available). If the failure is sufficiently
important (either in remaining backup capability, impact or potential
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consequence),thena safeor degradedoperationalstatemay beadopted to
maximize remaining capability or the systems shut down. In the
SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATIONS State (in the Normal Operation mode), all
processing proceeds normally, but there is less backup capability, and the
transition from COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION to
AVIONICS_SAFE/DEGRADED_OPN is transparent to the crew and the mission.
(This state is provided to recognize that the risk to the mission and vehicle has
increased, but that full mission capability is still available.) The only possible exit
from this state is to INTERRUPTWE_TEST or AV_SUBSYS_SHUT-DOWN to
ensure the system has recovered before operations continue.
INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for a delay
of the countdown to launch to perform tests which will interfere with normal
avionics processing capability, either through the introduction of test data, use of
special test programs, recording of special test results, activation of test switches
in the flight hardware and/or software, etc. When this state is commanded, the
specific test initial conditions to be executed must accompany the command. Exit
from this state requires a return to the AV_CONFIG & IN1T state to ensure all
potentially damaging test residues have been cleared from the system, or a shut-
down.
AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state is entered in
Launch Mission Mode when the launch is aborted and the systems must be shut-
down in an orderly manner. This state can also be entered if a cold restart of the
avionics is desired to try and correct problems.
C.2.2.3 States for Vehicle Safe/De_oraded Operation Vehicle Mo0e
When the Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle Mode is in effect during launch, the
avionics states shown in Figure C-16 (in black and white) may be entered. It is the mode
that the spacecraft will be put into by SOCS command when an anomaly occurs which is
sufficiently severe that there may be potential impact on the mission. Such an anomaly
cannot be treated by the systems (for instance by use of hot backups) in a manner which is
transparent to the crew, FSS and mission operation. Consider a fault tolerant spacecraft data
system with three primary computers and one backup computer. An example of such a
severe anomaly occurs if the backup mission computer has previously failed, the mission
was continued, and now one of the three primary mission computer fails under conditions
C-32
such that the mission must proceedwith no backupand missing one primary computer. In
this case, mission safety is not at immediate risk, but continuance of the mission does place
the vehicle at significantly increased risk since the ability to mask faults is severely limited
with only two computers in the fault tolerant set. The spacecraft is put into this
SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION Mode by a command from the crew, onboard SOCS or the
FSS. The spacecraft can only leave this mode by command from the crew or FSS. The only
modes the spacecraft can transition to from this mode are the Vehicle Integrated System
Test or Shut-down Vehicle Modes. In this Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle Mode,
the SOCS command issued as a minimum will include communicate telemetry, attitude
control and active ranging. The states are described below.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. While in the Launch Mission Mode, some
spare components may be made available for use under degraded conditions.
This state provides for a power off condition while they are physically made
available. Exit from this state occurs when a Power On command is issued for
the components made available to the avionics.
• _;TART SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. When a failed component which
placed the mission at risk is replaced by spare components, and power is applied,
then this state provides for activation of the newly available spares. Such
activation will typically require data system booting of the processor and making
the other data system components "aware" of the newly available components.
This state may provide for issuance of the power on command to activate the
new component. It will provide for performance of the component POST, and
loading any related component software needed. This state also provides for a
cold re-start after avionics shut-down, with just the SDSS boot routine running
to re-boot the SDSS.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. When new components are
brought on-line after a safe/degraded operations mode command, this state
establishes the configuration and initializes (or re-initializes) the components
being started. Any external avionics needed to support the newly initialized or
re-initialized component are POSTed and errors are handled.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. After new components
have been initialized, they transition to standby to await direction for use, or to
serve as hot backups as needed. Standby provides for the synchronization of data
and timing, with CBIT and FDIR to keep a functional capability.
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• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. In Launch, Safe/Degraded mode, it is
assumed special launch procedures will be required and used. These will
probably be human-intensive requiring extensive manual operation of switches.
Some system monitoring of the human proceedings, and manual activation of
selected automated routines will require close coordination and cooperation
between systems and humans in FSS.
• AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN Avionics Subsystem State. In the
Avionics Safe/Degraded Opn Vehicle Mode, this state is the normal state of
operation. Special routines which may require more human support, but less
processing resources, and special practices to maximize launch safety may be in
place to enable the launch to take place despite significantly higher risks from
insufficient backup devices or software. Special flight or mission critical system
bypasses may be in effect and processing precedence will probably have been
adjusted.
• INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for special
testing during a launch delay with severely degraded systems. After this testing
which interrupts launch operations and system processing, the return path goes
through either shut-down or reinitialization, which if successful means the
mission controllers can take the vehicle out of the Vehicle Safe/Degraded Opn
Otherwise they must either fly in a degraded condition or abortVehicle Mode.
the mission.
AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state is entered in
the Launch Mission Mode when the launch is delayed to try a restart to clear a
problem, or the launch is to be aborted.
C.2.2.4 States for Vehicle Shut-Down Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle Shut-Down Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics subsystem states
shown previously in Figure C-8 (in black and white) may be entered in the Launch Mission
Mode. Vehicle Shut-Down mode may be preparatory to either turning the vehicle to the
Vehicle Off mode or to the Vehicle Initialization mode (for instance, to re-initialize vehicle
subsystems). Avionics subsystem states which may be entered include MANUAL_OP,
COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION, AND AV_suBsYS_SHUT-DOWN states, as described
in Section C.1.2.5.
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C.2.2.5 States for Vehicle Off Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle Off Vehicle Mode is in effect, the only applicable avionics state is
ALL_OFF, as previously shown in Figure C-4. In the Launch Mission Mode, this vehicle
mode and state are entered when a decision is made to terminate the mission countdown
and abort the launch. An external power off command signal must be issued by the GSS to
fully power down the spacecraft. This transition cannot be created by the spacecraft SDSS (as
noted by the lack of an arrow from shut-down to off modes), and described in Section
C.1.2.1.
C.2.3 STATES ALLOWED IN BOOST MISSION MODE
In the Boost Mission Mode, vehicle modes which can be utilized are Normal Operation and
Vehicle Safe/Degrade Operation, as previously shown in Figure C-11. The other vehicle
modes are not available because they could possible allow hazardous conditions to be
carried out (for instance by transitioning to shut-down mode during boost) or do not make
sense (for instance using training mode during the program controlled boost period). The
following subsections identify the avionics subsystem states allowable in each of these
vehicle modes.
C.2.3.1 States for Normal Operation VehlclQ Mode
When the Normal Operation Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics states previously
shown in Figure C-15 (in black and white) may be entered in the Boost Mission Mode.
These states are addressed below. Detailed descriptions of the following states were
previously provided in Section C.2.2.2.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. While boosting in Normal Operation
mode, some of the avionics subsystems not immediately needed may be in the
ALL_OFF state.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for converting a
hot backup into a primary resource, activation of spare units for use, or cold
restart of avionics elements after an avionics shut-down.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state enables the
configuration and initialization (or re-initialization) of components being started
during boost operations.
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• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for
operating components to remain in a quiescent condition utilizing minimum
power until they need to transition to active use.
• MANI./AL OP Avionics Subsystem State. During boost Normal Operation
mode, it is assumed operations are automated. However, if necessary for human
intervention, then this state provides for the system to monitor human actions
to enable the system to operate in support of such actions.
• COMPI.]TER-AIDED OPERATION Avionics Subsystem State. This is the
normal state for Boost Mode operations. Entry takes place upon transition from
the Launch Mission Mode to the Boost Mission Mode; the mission mode
transition command, Start Boost Mission Mode, causes entry into the
COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION state. Upon entry, fully automated boost
operations begin from engine ignition until orbital insertion. Exit from this state
in Boost Mission Mode occurs when a failure is identified and continuance of the
mission is needed, requiring a switch to the
AVIONICS_SAFE/DEGRADED_OPN state. Otherwise, the avionics may not be
commanded to change states under normal boost conditions. Of course,
MANUAL OP state override is always available to crew or FSS.
• AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN Avionics Subsystem State. While the
vehicle is in the Boost Mission Mode (subsequent to engine ignition and liftoff),
if a failure occurs, then a safe or degraded operational state must be adopted to
maximize remaining capability. This state lasts in Normal Operation Vehicle
Mode until either safe orbit is achieved or a decision (and subsequent actions) to
abort is completed. In this state (in the Normal Operation mode), all processing
proceeds normally, but there is less backup capability, and the transition from
COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION to AVIONICS_SAFE/DEGRADED_OPN is
transparent to the crew and the mission. (This state is provided to recognize that
the risk to the mission and vehicle has increased, but that full mission capability
is still available.) The only possible exit from this state is to
INTERRUPTWE_TEST or AV_SUBSYS_SHUT-DOWN to ensure the system
has recovered before operations continue.
• INTERRUPTIVE TEST Aviqnics Subsystem State. This state is a high risk
alternative which may only be used during boost if high risk failures occur which
require immediate resolution despite potential impact on boost operations. (It is
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assumedif the mission has already become very risky, but time is available to test
problems, then the additional risk to perform tests which will interfere with
normal avionics processing capability is not very significant. Such additional risk
can possible reduce the mission risk if problems can be identified and resolved in
real-time.) Exit from this state requires a return to the AV_CONFIG_&_INIT
state to ensure all potentially damaging test residues have been cleared from the
system, or a shut-down. Use of this state in boost should be accompanied by clear
warnings about specific hazards which may be caused by its use.
AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state is entered in
Boost Mission Mode when specific failed avionics must be powered down or cold
restarted to try and correct problems. Use of this state may be hazardous, and
should be hedged with cautions and double checks to ensure only components
are shut-down which would be more hazardous if left operating.
C.2.3.2 States for Vehicle Safe/Deo_raded Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle Mode is in effect during Boost
Operation Mission Mode, the avionics states previously shown in Figure C-16 (in black and
white) may be entered. It is the mode that the spacecraft will be put into by the onboard
SOCS, crew or FSS command when an anomaly occurs which is sufficiently severe that
there may be potential impact on the mission. Such an anomaly cannot be treated by the
systems (for instance by use of hot backups) in a manner which is transparent to the crew,
FSS and mission operation. These states are addressed below. Detailed descriptions of the
following states were previously provided in Section C.2.2.3.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. While in the Boost Mission Mode, some of
the avionics subsystems not immediately needed may be in the ALL_OFF state.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for converting a
hot backup into a primary resource, activation of spare units for use, or cold
restart of avionics elements after an avionics shut-down.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state enables the
configuration and initialization (or re-initialization) of components being started
during boost operations.
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• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for
operating components to remain in a quiescent condition utilizing minimum
power until they need to transition to active use.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. While boost in Normal Operation
mode is assumed to be automated, if sufficiently severe anomalies occur to force
the onboard SOCS, crew or FSS to place the vehicle into Vehicle Safe/Degraded
Opn Vehicle Mode, then manual control if a crew is onboard can be used to try
and recover the mission. Thus, this state provides for the system to monitor
human actions to enable the system to operate in support of such actions. The
human actions may also command specific automated routines/programs to
execute even though the avionics are not under full automated control.
• AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN Avionics Subsystem State. In the
Avionics Safe/Degraded Opn Vehicle Mode, this state is the normal state of
operation. Special routines which may require more human support, but less
processing resources, and special practices to maximize crew safety (if a crew is on
board) may be in place to enable the boost to continue or to implement approved
abort procedures.
• INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. This state providesfor special
testing during a boost with severely degraded systems to determine how to
protect the crew or mission. Use of this state in Boost Mission Mode and Vehicle
Safe/Degraded Vehicle Mode will probably have significant impact on vehicle
safety.
• AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state is entered in
the Boost Mission Mode when specific avionics are determined to be a cause of
the problem, and it is determined that shutting down selected avionics is safer
than allowing them to continue operating.
C.2.4 STATES ALLOWED IN ORBIT COAST/TRANSFER MISSION MODE
In the Orbit Coast/Transfer Mission Mode, all vehicle modes are available for use, as
previously shown in Figure C-11. The following subsections identify the avionics
subsystem states allowable in each vehicle mode.
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C.2.4.1 States for Vehicle Off Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle Off Vehicle Mode is in effect during orbit coast/transfer, the only
applicable avionics state is ALL_OFF, as previously shown in Figure C-4. In Orbit
Coast/Transfer Mission Mode, this vehicle mode and state are provided to enable FSS,
onboard SOCS or the crew to turn off subsystems not needed for current mission
operations. This mode may also be used to turn off all subsystems on the primary vehicle
(completely) if needed for some purpose, although such action would apparently increase
the risk to crew (if any) safety. Such subsystems may also need to be turned back on at a later
time. These states are addressed below. Detailed descriptions of the following states were
previously provided in Section C.1.2.1.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State Entry. Entry into this state requires an
external power off command signal to be activated by either crew or FSS to fully
power down a spacecraft. As a safety precaution, SDSS and SOCS cannot issue
such a command since it causes SDSS to fully shut-down with no power
available for re-start (unless externally applied). Fully powering down the
primary spacecraft would increase the hazard to crew safety due to the potential
risk of being unable to restart the spacecraft, and thus should only be undertaken
as an extreme measure.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State Exit. Exit from this state requires application
of external power, special battery operated non-avionics capability (such as a
timer or external command operated switch), or physically switching the avionics
on by a crew member. When power is applied, the vehicle mode changes, thus
allowing the avionics state to change. When the Vehicle Off Vehicle Mode
changes to the Vehicle Initialization Vehicle Mode, additional avionics states are
allowed as described below.
,_.j
C.2.4.2 States for Vehicle Initialization Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle .Initialization Vehicle Mode is used to start or restart a spacecraft, the
avionics subsystem states previously shown in Figure C-5 (in black and white) may be
entered while in the Orbit Coast/Transfer Mission Mode. These states are addressed below.
Detailed descriptions of the following states were previously provided in Section C.1.2.2.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. When the spacecraft first switches from the
Vehicle Off to Vehicle Initialization Vehicle Modes, it starts off in the ALL_OFF
Avionics Subsystem State. The power on command is applied with external or
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otherwise (as noted above) to cause the vehicle mode to switch and the ALL_OFF
state to be exited.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. After applying powering to the
avionics, the SDSS must be booted and the initial program load for the data
system services, the command processor and the external avionics software must
be done.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. After the avionics are started,
then they must be setup for operation and initialized.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. After the avionics have
initialized and are ready for operation, they must enter the standby state to
ensure all subsystems are properly synchronized. The system remains quiescent
and ready to implement subsequent mode commands.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. This state ensures that automatic
processes do not work against the actions being manually carried out, and that
the system monitors manual actions to maintain cognizance of their state and
results. Manual control actions always have priority over other system
functions. Potentially hazardous manual actions will cause an alert or caution to
the crew and FSS.
• INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. While the vehicle is
initializing, interruptive test may be directed if testing more extensive than POST
is needed.
• AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state enables an
orderly shut-down of avionics system elements.
C.2.4.3 States for Standby Vehicle Mode
When the Standby Vehicle Mode is in effect, avionics states as previously shown in Figure
C-6 may be entered while in the Orbit Coast/Transfer Mission Mode. These states are
addressed below. Detailed descriptions of the following states were previously provided in
Section C.1.2.3.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. In the Standby Vehicle Mode, this state
provides controls over those avionics subsystems which are still powered down.
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• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides the controls for
component boot up when additional units are added to the system services. It
also provides for rebooted or cold starting SDSS elements to improve system
operability.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. After a new processing
resource has been started, then this state provides controls to configure and
initialize them.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state is the normal
state for most components while the Standby Vehicle Mode is in effect. CB1T,
FDIR and routine housekeeping SDSS processes will operate normally.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. While the avionics are generally in a
holding state, manual control of the system is always capable of being executed by
the crew or FSS.
• AV SUBSYS SHUTDOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for
powering off specific components while in the Standby Vehicle Mode.
C.2.4.4 States for Inte(]rated System Test Vehicle Mode
When the Integrated System (End-to-End) Test Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics
subsystem states previously shown in Figure C-7 (in black and white) may be entered in the
Orbit Coast/Transfer Mission Mode. These states are addressed below. Detailed descriptions
of the following states were previously provided in Section C.1.2.4.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for control of specific
test equipment as needed in end-to-end testing.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls for test
equipment newly powered on to perform POST and download needed software.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state controls starting
external test equipment and software, and configuring and initializing them for
operation.
• AV _I, IBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state causes the test
subsystems to become quiescent until explicitly commanded to carry out specific
directed actions.
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• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides control to support
manually operated test instrumentation and systems under test.
• COMPUTER-AIDED OPERATION Avionics Subsystem State. This state
provides control for fully automatic operation of the test systems.
• INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls
over the specific tests to be executed and data to be recorded and/or analyzed.
• AV SUBSYS MAINTENANCE Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides
controls, for special maintenance equipment and programs.
• AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides
control to shut-down the test capability and the system under test, and reset
avionics to normal avionics states.
C.2.4.5 States for Normal Ooeration Vehicle Mode
When the Normal Operation Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics states previously
shown in Figure C-15 (in black and white) may be entered in the Orbit Coast/Transfer
Mission Mode. These states are addressed below. Detailed descriptions of the following
states were previously provided in Section C.2.2.2.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides control over those
avionics subsystems which are still in the ALL_OFF state.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls for starting
or re-starting avionics while in orbit or transferring to another orbit.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls
for configuring and initializing (or re-initializing) components being started.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls
over avionics in a quiescent condition while they await direction for use.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. In Orbit Coast/Transfer, Normal
Operation mode, this state provides controls to enable the systems to monitor
human actions and to operate in support of such actions.
• COMPUTER-AIDED OPERATION Avionics Subsystem State. This is the
normal state for orbiting station-keeping and house-keeping operations. It
provides the controls to enable the spacecraft to operate safely and consistently
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with the missionpayload or scienceoperations. It trackscrew activities and
monitors critical systemsand crew environmentsto ensurecrew, vehicle and
mission safety.
• AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN Avionics Subsystem State. This state
provide control for responding to minor failures which can be handled
transparently to the crew and mission (if in accordance with established
practices). Normal processing with less backup can be accomplished. (This state
is provided to recognize that the risk to the mission and vehicle has increased,
but that full mission capability is still available.)
• INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls
for tests which will interfere with normal avionics processing capability.
• AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides
controls to shut-down avionics systems in an orderly manner while in orbit or
transferring orbital planes.
C.2.4.6 _'t_tes for Vehicle Tralnln_o Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle Training Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics states shown in Figure
C-17 (in black and white) may be entered in the Orbit Coast/Transfer Mission Mode.
Training mode may only be used while in orbit coast (and not in orbit transfer) as a safety
precaution. It is assumed a key part of the training system, will be simulations to enable
crew members to refresh themselves on how subsystems work when not actually being
used, and to try out alternative procedures for equipment to address new problems or
conditions as directed by FSS. These states are described below.
• ALL OR Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides control over the
training subsystems which start out in the ALL_OFF state. Upon command to
enter Vehicle Training Vehicle Mode, the SOCS will issue the power on
command for the training subsystem and ancillary equipment.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls for starting
service connections with the training subsystems and the SDSS while in orbit.
This includes performing POST on the training equipment and loading special
training software. This state also provides for cold restart of the avionics after
training mode if needed to purge training data from the system.
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• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls
for configuring and initializing training components and software being started.
Selection of equipment to be used for training is part of the configuration process.
It includes setup up controls to ensure the training system can be unambiguously
overridden by actual alerts and warnings if needed.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls
over the training system when it must be placed in a quiescent condition while
higher priority tasks interrupt, but termination of the training activities or the
current training scenario is not desired.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. In Orbit Coast/Transfer, Normal
Operation mode, this state provides controls to enable the actual avionics systems
to monitor human actions in training and in non-training operations, keep them
separate and to support of both sets of actions.
• COMPUTER-AIDED OPERATION Avionics Subsystem State. This provides the
controls to enable all interfacing real avionics subsystems and the specialized
training systems (controlled by AV_SUBSYS TRAINING as described in the
next paragraph) to interoperate. One essential capability in this state is for the
controls to track and differentiate between "real" mission data and training data
being used and exchanged with the training system. It provides the controls to
enable the spacecraft to operate safely and consistently with the training activities
as they (possibly) interact with the mission operational systems. It tracks crew
activities and monitors critical systems and crew environments to ensure crew,
vehicle and mission safety. This state also ensures that all training data,
conditions, scenario residuals, and other avionics equipment are returned to an
operational condition after the end of training.
• AV SUBSYS TRAINING Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides
controls for the training equipment and programs which will be used. Training
subsystems might include such capabilities as simulations to represent the
appearance of mission system interfaces and their behavior, emulation's of real
environmental conditions not currently available to crew operations, and
interfaces to real avionics subsystems to enable their use for training (i.e., with
much greater allowances for error, and recognition that the results are training
data not to be confused with real mission operational data). Special training
"instructor" programs, scoring programs, computer-aided instructional programs
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and pre-cannedscenariosfor learning special condition simulated experiences
might be available. Entry into this state would be by execution of the Start
Training Mode command. Exit from this state would be by the End Training
State or End Training Mode commands. As shown in the diagram, this state
must be ended to return to COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION before the system
may actually be powered down.
AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides
controls to shut-down the training system in an orderly manner while in orbit.
A prerequisite to training power off is that COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION
state has successfully purged all training residuals from the operational systems.
C.2.4.7 States for Vehicle Safe/Deoraded Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle Mode is in effect during Orbit
Coast/Transfer Mission Mode, the avionics states previously shown in Figure C-16 fin black
and white) may be entered. It is the mode that the spacecraft will be put into by the onboard
SOCS, crew or FSS command when an anomaly occurs which is sufficiently severe that
there may be potential impact on the mission. Such an anomaly cannot be treated by the
systems (for instance by use of hot backups) in a manner which is transparent to the crew,
FSS and mission operation. The states are addressed below. Detailed descriptions of the
following states were previously provided in Section C.2.2.3.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. While in the Orbit Coast/Transfer Mission
Mode, some of the avionics subsystems not immediately needed may be in the
ALL_OFF state.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for converting a
hot backup into a primary resource, activation of spare units for use, or cold
restart of avionics elements after an avionics shut-down.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state enables the
w
configuration and initialization (or re-initialization) of components being started
during orbit or orbital transfer operations.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for
operating components to remain in a quiescent condition utilizing minimum
power until they need to transition to active use.
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• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. While orbit and coast operations do
not usually endure stressful timelines, orbital transfer operations may have high
priority systems operating either semi-automatically or fully-automatically. If
sufficiently severe anomalies occur to force the onboard SOCS, crew or FSS to
place the vehicle into Vehicle Safe/Degraded Opn Vehicle Mode, then manual
control if a crew is present can be used to try and recover the mission. Thus, this
state provides for the system to monitor human actions to enable the system to
operate in support of such actions. The human actions may also command
specific automated routines/programs to execute even though the avionics are
not under full automated control.
• AVIONICS SAFFJDEGRADED OPN Avionics Subsystem State. In the
Avionics Safe/Degraded Opn Vehicle Mode, this state is the normal state of
operation. Special routines which may require more human support, but less
processing resources, and special practices to maximize crew safety may be in
place to enable the safe orbit or orbital'transfer operations to continue or to
implement approved abort procedures.
• INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for special
testing during orbit or orbital transfer operations with severely degraded systems
to determine how to protect the crew or mission. Use of this state in orbital
transfer mission mode while in Vehicle Safe/Degraded Vehicle Mode will
probably have significant impact on vehicle safety.
• AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state is entered in
the Orbit Coast/Transfer Mission Mode when specific avionics are determined to
be a cause of the problem, and it is determined that shutting down selected
avionics is safer than allowing them to continue operating.
C.2.4.8 States for Periodic Maintenance Vehicle Mode
When the Periodic Maintenance Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics states shown in
Figure C-9 (in black and white) may be entered in the Orbit Coast/Transfer Mission Mode.
Periodic maintenance is required when component anomalies or failures have occurred, or
sufficient time has passed that equipment needs to be checked, and there is sufficient time
in the mission schedule to pull and examine equipment. Note that although parts of the
vehicle are undergoing periodic maintenance, since the mission is still underway in space,
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actual missionavionicsactivity for critical taskssuchaslife support and ground
communicationsmust continue. The statesaredescribedbelow.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides control over the special
maintenance subsystems which start out in the ALL_OFF state. Upon command
to enter Periodic Maintenance Vehicle Mode, the SOCS will issue the power on
command for the maintenance subsystem and ancillary equipment.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls for starting
service connections with the maintenance subsystems and the SDSS while in
orbit. If the mission mode in one of transferring to another orbit, periodic
maintenance will be delayed until orbit coast is re-established. This includes
performing POST on the maintenance equipment and loading special
maintenance software. This state also provides for cold restart of the avionics
after maintenance mode if needed to purge maintenance data from the system.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls
for configuring and initializing (or re-initializing) components being started.
Selection of equipment to be used for maintenance or to undergo maintenance is
part of the configuration process. It includes setup up controls to ensure the
maintenance subsystem can be unambiguously overridden by actual alerts and
warnings if needed. It also includes loading and unloading special maintenance
versions of operational flight programs if needed.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides controls
over the maintenance equipment when it must be placed in a quiescent
condition while higher priority tasks interrupt, but termination of the
maintenance activities or the current maintenance examination is not desired.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. In Orbit Coast/Transfer, Normal
Operation mode, this state provides controls to enable the actual avionics systems
not in maintenance mode to monitor human actions in maintenance and in
non-maintenance operations, keep them separate and to support both sets of
actions.
• AV SUBSYS MAINTENANGE Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides
controls for the maintenance equipment and programs which will be used. It is
the normal state for this mode. Maintenance subsystems might include such
capabilities as simulations to represent the appearance of mission system
interfaces and their behavior, emulation's of real environmental conditions not
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currently available to crew operations, and interfaces to real avionics subsystems
to enable their use in stimulating avionics being maintained. Entry into this
state would be by execution of the Start Periodic Maintenance Mode command.
Exit from this state would be caused by the End Maintenance Mode or End
AV_SUBSYS_MAINTENANCE State commands, and result in transition to the
AV_SUBSYS_SHUT-DOWN state.
INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem Stata. This state provides controls
for special maintenance tests needed. (It is presumed that many of these tests will
interfere with normal avionics processing capability, which is acceptable in
maintenance mode). It also provides for injection of special maintenance data
(e.g., data with known results) into input ports on sensors and other devices.
AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides
controls to shut-down maintenance subsystems in an orderly manner while in
orbit. It provides for the orderly shut-down (and eventual restart) of avionics
which may need to be removed for repair or have been repaired or need to be
shut-down and restarted to purge confused state conditions.
C.2.4.9 States for Vehicle Shut-Down VehiGle Mode
When the Vehicle Shut-Down Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics subsystem states
shown previously in Figure C-8 (in black and white) may be entered in the Orbit
Coast/Transfer Mission Mode. Vehicle Shut-Down mode may be preparatory to either
turning the vehicle to the Vehicle Off mode (if it is being placed in long term hibernation or
storage) or to the Vehicle Initialization mode (for instance, to re-initialize vehicle
subsystems on ancillary spacecraft). Avionics subsystem states which may be entered
include MANUAL_OP, COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION, AND AV_SUBSYS_SHUT-
DOWN states, as described in Section C.1.2.5.
C.2.5 STATES ALLOWED IN DEORBIT MISSION MODE
In the Deorbit Mission Mode, vehicle modes which can be utilized are Normal Operation
and Vehicle Safe/Degrade Operation, as previously shown in Figure C-13. The other
vehicle modes are not available because they could possible allow hazardous conditions to
be carried out (for instance by transitioning to shut-down mode during engine firing or
thrusting during deorbit) or do not make sense (for instance using training mode during
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the program controlled deorbit period). During the Deorbit Mission Mode, the SOCS ( may
be in response to crew inputs if a crew is onboard) or FSS will issue the command to
maneuver, reconfigure for landing, jettison unneeded equipment (for example solar panels
and spacecraft elements to remain in orbit), do deorbit burn and perform final preparations
for powered descent. SOCS will issue the commands to control the spacecraft during
powered descent. The following subsections identify the avionics subsystem states
allowable in each of these vehicle modes.
C.2.5.1 States for Normal Operation Vehicle Mode
When the Normal Operation Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics states previously
shown in Figure C-15 (in black and white) may be entered in the Deorbit Mission Mode.
These states are addressed below. Detailed descriptions of the following states were
previously provided in Section C.2.2.2.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. While thrusting in Normal Operation
mode, some of the avionics subsystems not immediately needed may be in the
ALL_OFF state.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for converting a
hot backup into a primary resource, activation of spare units for use, or cold
restart of avionics elements after an avionics shut-down.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state enables the
configuration and initialization (or re-initialization) of components being started
during deorbit operations.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for
operating components to remain in a quiescent condition utilizing minimum
power until they need to transition to active use.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. During deorbit Normal Operation
mode, it is assumed operations are automated. However, if necessary for human
intervention, then this state provides for the system to monitor human actions
to enable the system to operate in support of such actions.
• COMPUTER-AIDED OPERATION Avionics Subsystem State. This is the
normal state for Deorbit Mode operations. Entry takes place upon transition
from the Orbit Coast/Transfer or direct from Boost Mission Modes to the Deorbit
Mission Mode; the mission mode transition command, Start Deorbit Mission
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@Mode, causes entry into the COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION state. Upon
entry, fully automated deorbit operations begin from engine ignition until the
spacecraft is ready to begin terminal area maneuvering (if any) or touchdown
(whichever occurs sooner). Exit from this state in Deorbit Mission Mode occurs
when a failure is identified and continuance of the mission is needed, requiring a
switch to the AVIONICS_SAFE/DEGRADED_OPN state. Otherwise, the
avionics may be not commanded to change states under normal deorbit
conditions. Of course, MANUAL_OP state override is always available to crew or
FSS.
AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN Avionics Subsystem State. While the
vehicle is in the Deorbit Mission and Normal Operation Vehicle Modes, if a
failure occurs, then a safe or degraded operational state must be adopted to
maximize remaining capability. This state lasts until either safe landing is
achieved or a decision (and subsequent actions) to abort the deorbit (if possible) is
completed. In this state (in the Normal Operation mode), all processing proceeds
normally, but there is less backup capability, and the transition from
COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION to AVIONICS_SAFE/DEGRADED_OPN is
transparent to the crew and the mission. (This state is provided to recognize that
the risk to the mission and vehicle has increased, but that full mission capability
is still available.) The only possible exit from this state is to
INTERRUPTWE_TEST or AV_SUBSYS_SHUT-DOWN to ensure the system
has recovered before operations continue.
INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. This state is a high risk
alternative which may oniy be used during deorbit if high risk failures occur
which require immediate resolution despite potential impact on deorbit
operations. (It is assumed if the mission has already become very risky, but time
is available to test problems, then the additional risk to perform tests which will
interfere with normal avionics processing capability is not very significant. Such
additional risk can possible reduce the mission risk if problems can be identified
and resolved in real-time.) Exit from this state requires a return to the
AV_CONFIG & INIT state to ensure all potentially damaging test residues have
been cleared from the system, or a shut-down. Use of this state in deorbit should
be accompanied by clear warnings about specific hazards which may be caused by
its use.
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AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state is entered in
Deorbit Mission Mode when specific failed avionics must be powered down or
cold restarted to try and correct problems. Use of this state may be hazardous, and
should be hedged with cautions and double checks to ensure only components
are shut-down which would be more hazardous if left operating.
C.2.5.2 States for Vehicle Safe/Deoraded Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle Mode is in effect during Deorbit
Mission Mode, the avionics states previously shown in Figure C-16 (in black and white)
may be entered. It is the mode that the spacecraft will be put into by the onboard SOCS, crew
or FSS command when an anomaly occurs which is sufficiently severe that there may be
potential impact on the mission. Such an anomaly cannot be treated by the systems (for
instance by use of hot backups) in a manner which is transparent to the crew, FSS and
mission operation. These states are addressed below. Detailed descriptions of the following
states were previously provided in Section C.2.2.3.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. While in the Deorbit Mission Mode, some
of the avionics subsystems not immediately needed may be in the ALL_OFF
state.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for converting a
hot backup into a primary resource, activation of spare units for use, or cold
restart of avionics elements after an avionics shut-down.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state enables the
configuration and initialization (or re-initialization) of components being started
during deorbit operations.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for
operating components to remain in a quiescent condition utilizing minimum
power until they need to transition to active use.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. While deorbit in Normal Operation
mode is assumed to be automated, if sufficiently severe anomalies occur to force
the crew or FSS to place the vehicle into Vehicle Safe/Degraded Opn Vehicle
Mode, then it is assumed only manual control can be used to try and recover the
mission. Thus, this state provides for the system to monitor human actions to
enable the system to operate in support of such actions. The human actions may
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also command specific automatedroutines/programs to executeeventhough the
avionics are not under full automated control.
• AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN Avionics Subsystem State. In the
Avionics Safe/Degraded Opn Vehicle Mode, this state is the normal state of
operation. Special routines which may require more human support, but less
processing resources, and special practices to maximize crew safety may be in
place to enable the deorbit to continue or to implement approved abort
procedures.
• INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for special
testing during a deorbit with severely degraded systems to determine how to
protect the crew or mission. Use of this state in Deorbit Mission Mode and
Vehicle Safe/Degraded Vehicle Mode will probably have significant impact on
vehicle safety.
• AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state is entered in
the Deorbit Mission Mode when specific avionics are determined to be a cause of
the problem, and it is determined that shutting down selected avionics is safer
than allowing them to continue operating.
C.2.6 STATES ALLOWED IN LANDING MISSION MODE
In the Landing Mission Mode, vehicle modes which can be utilized are Normal Operation
and Vehicle Safe/Degrade Operation, as previously shown in Figure C-14. The other
vehicle modes are not available because they could possible allow hazardous conditions to
be carried out (for instance by transitioning to shut-down mode during engine firing during
touchdown) or do not make sense (for instance using training mode during the program
controlled touchdown period). On sensing the touchdown, the SOCS will issue commands
to terminate thrust and transition into the Post Landing Mission Mode.
The following three phase landing scenario sequence was extracted from [KIL92].
• Phase 1 Braking: GN&C issues commands for full throttle from all eight engines
and pitch of -15 degrees.
• Phase 2 Begin Pitchup and Thrust Reduction: GN&C issues commands for a 60
degree pitchup to vertical attitude at a 1.2 degrees per second rate, and reduces
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throttle by issuingcommandsto shut down pairs of engines very 20 seconds until
only two engines are running for 25% of throttle.
Phase 3 Final Vertical Descent Phase: The LVS is in a vertical attitude and the
throttle is at 25%.
The following subsections identify the avionics subsystem states allowable in each of these
vehicle modes.
C.2.6.1 States for Normal ODeratlon Vehicle Mode
When the Normal Operation Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics states previously
shown in Figure C-15 (in black and white) may be entered in the Landing Mission Mode.
These states are addressed below. Detailed descriptions of the following states were
previously provided in Section C.2.2.2.
• p, LL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. When landing in Normal Operation mode,
some of the avionics subsystems not immediately needed may be in the
ALL_OFF state.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for converting a
hot backup into a primary resource during landing.
• AV CONFIG & INIT AviQni_$ Subsystem State. This state enables the
configuration and initialization (or re-initialization) of components being started
during landing operations.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for
operating components to remain in a quiescent condition utilizing minimum
power until they need to transition to active use.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. During landing Normal Operation
mode, it is assumed operations are automated. However, if necessary for human
intervention, then this state provides for the system to monitor human actions
to enable the system to operate in support of such actions.
• COMPUTER-AIDED OPERATION Avionics Subsystem State. This is the
normal state for Landing Mode operations. Entry takes place upon transition
from the Deorbit or direct from Boost Mission Modes to the Landing Mission
Mode; the mission mode transition command, Start Landing Mission Mode,
causes entry into the COMPUTER-AIDED OPERATION state. Upon entry, fully
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automated landing operations begin with terminal areamaneuvering (if any) or
touchdown (whichever occurs sooner) and end with completion of touchdown
and systems sating. Exit from this state in Landing Mission Mode occurs when a
failure is identified and continuance of the mission is needed, requiring a switch
to the AVIONICS_SAFE/DEGRADED_OPN state. Otherwise, the avionics may
be not commanded to change states under normal deorbit conditions. Of course,
MANUAL_OP state override is always available to crew or FSS.
AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN Avionics Subsystem Statp. While the
vehicle is in the Landing Mission and Normal Operation Vehicle Modes, if a
failure occurs, then a safe or degraded operational state must be adopted to
maximize remaining capability. This state lasts until safe touchdown is
completed. In this state (in the Normal Operation mode), all processing proceeds
normally, but there is less backup capability, and the transition from
COMPUTER-AIDED_OPERATION to AVIONICS_SAFE/DEGRADED_OPN is
transparent to the crew and the mission. (This state is provided to recognize that
the risk to the mission and vehicle has increased, but that full mission capability
is still available.) The only possible exit from this state is to
INTERRUPTWE_TEST or AV_SUBSYS_SHUT-DOWN to ensure the system
has recovered before operations continue.
INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem Stat_. This state is a high risk
alternative which may only be used during landing if high risk failures occur
which require immediate resolution despite potential impact on landing
operations. (It is assumed if the mission has already become very risky, but time
is available to test problems, then the additional risk to perform tests which will
interfere with normal avionics processing capability is not very significant. Such
additional risk can possible reduce the mission risk if problems can be identified
and resolved in real-time.) Exit from this state requires a return to the
AV_CONFIG & INIT state to ensure all potentially damaging test residues have
been cleared from the system, or a shut-down. Use of this state in landing should
be accompanied by clear warnings about specific hazards which may be caused by
its use.
AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state is entered in
Landing Mission Mode when specific failed avionics must be powered down or
the mission has ended and touchdown has been completed. Use of this state may
be hazardous, and should be hedged with cautions and double checks to ensure
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only components are shut-down which would be more hazardous if left
operating.
C.2.6.2 States for Vehicle Safe/Deqraded Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle Mode is in effect during Landing
Mission Mode, the avionics states previously shown in Figure C-16 (in black and white)
may be entered. It is the mode that the spacecraft will be put into by the onboard SOCS, crew
or FSS command when an anomaly occurs which is sufficiently severe that there may be
potential impact on the mission. Such an anomaly cannot be treated by the systems (for
instance by use of hot backups) in a manner which is transparent to the crew, FSS and
mission operation. These states are addressed below. Detailed descriptions of the following
states were previously provided in Section C.2.2.3.
• ALL OFF Avionics Subsystem State. While in the Landing Mission Mode, some
of the avionics subsystems not immediately needed may be in the ALL_OFF
state.
• START SDSS Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for converting a
hot backup into a primary resource, activation of spare units for use, or cold
restart of avionics elements after an avionics shut-down.
• AV CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State. This state enables the
configuration and initialization (or re-initialization) of components being started
during landing operations.
• AV SUBSYS STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for
operating components to remain in a quiescent condition utilizing minimum
power until they need to transition to active use.
• MANUAL OP Avionics Subsystem State. While landing in Normal Operation
mode is assumed to be automated, if sufficiently severe anomalies occur to force
the onboard SOCS, crew or FSS to place the vehicle into Vehicle Safe/Degraded
Opn Vehicle Mode, manual control can be used to try and recover the mission.
Thus, this state provides for the system to monitor human actions to enable the
system to operate in support of such actions. The human actions may also
command specific automated routines/programs to execute even though the
avionics are not under full automated control.
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• AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN Avionics Subsystem State. In the
Avionics Safe/Degraded Opn Vehicle Mode, this state is the normal state of
operation. Special routines which may require more human support, but less
processing resources, and special practices to maximize crew safety may be in
place to enable the landing to continue.
• INTERRUPTIVE TEST Avionics Subsystem State. This state provides for special
testing during a landing with severely degraded systems to determine how to
protect the crew or mission. Use of this state in Landing Mission Mode and
Vehicle Safe/Degraded Vehicle Mode will probably have significant impact on
vehicle safety.
• AV SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN Avionics Subsystem State. This state is entered in
the Landing Mission Mode when specific avionics are determined to be a cause of
the problem, and it is determined that shutting down selected avionics is safer
than allowing them to continue operating or touchdown has been completed.
C.3 TERMINAL MISSION PHASE MODES AND STATES ALLOWEO
The Terminal Mission Phase consists of those vehicle modes in which the spacecraft has
landed and the crew are conducting mission, science or payload operations on the surface
after a successful landing (presumably on the moon or another planet).
C.3.1 MODES ALLOWED IN THE TERMINAL MISSION PHASE
The mission modes in this phase are the Post-Landing and Shut-Down Mission Modes.
During each of these mission modes, the vehicle can be put into the vehicle modes
identified below within each mission mode. (The Vehicle Surface Proximity Operations
and Surface Mobile Operations modes are not addressed in this scenario.)
C.3.1.1 Post Landlno Mlsslon MQ0e
This mode is shown in Figure C-18. It begins after touchdown and spacecraft sating. In this
mode, the SOCS, crew, FSS and spacecraft systems prepare the spacecraft to be able to
support science and payload operations to the extent consistent with mission requirements.
This mode can only be entered from the Landing Mission Mode. While a spacecraft on
another planetary body may be able to return to Earth, the activities leading to Earth return
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are treated (for the purposes of this paper) as another mission with a full pre-launch to
landing cycle of its own.
C.3.1.2 Shut-Down Mission Mode
This mode is shown in Figure C-19. It begins after the spacecraft has been prepared or
configured for science and payload operations. For missions which have landed on other
planetary bodies, this mode shuts down the spacecraft systems not needed to perform crew
life support and mission support for science and payload operations. (It is assumed for this
paper' s scenario and required for the Artemis scenario that systems support for such
operations are handled by independent systems not integrated into the spacecraft systems.)
This mode ends when the Pre-Launch Mode cycle starts to prepare the mission for return to
Earth. For a mission which has returned to Earth, the Shut-Down Mission mode provides
the controls to safely end spacecraft avionics processing, download data and materials to
FSS, and enable the crew to depart the spacecraft safely.
C.3.2 STATES ALLOWED IN POST-LANDING MISSION MODE
In the Post-Landing Mission Mode, vehicle modes which can be utilized are Normal
Operation, Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation, Integrated System Test, Periodic Maintenance,
and Vehicle Shut-Down, as previously shown in Figure C-18. When the Post-Landing
Mission Mode is entered, it must transition from either the Normal Operation or Vehicle
Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle modes, since only these modes are available from the
Landing Mission Mode. Exit from the Post-Landing Mission mode is as shown in Figure C-
18. While landed on another planetary body, exit from the Post-Landing Mission Mode
would probably not allow a transition to the Shut-Down Mission Mode, but would include
a return to the Pre-Launch Mission Mode (not shown in Figure C-18) to return to the Earth.
The following subsections identify the avionics subsystem states allowable in each of these
vehicle modes.
C.3.2.1 States for Normal ODeration Vehicle Mode
When the Normal Operation Vehicle Mode is in use, the avionics states previously shown
in Figure C-15 (in black and white) may be entered in the Post-Landing Mission Mode.
These states were previously described in Section C.2.2.2. Normal operation is concerned
with providing the post-landing support needed on another planetary body to enable the
crew to survive and/or to support the mission's science and payload processing systems.
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On Earth, normal operation is concerned with enabling the vehicle to returned to its post-
mission processing facility. This vehicle mode is entered from the Landing Mission Mode's
Normal Operation Vehicle Mode and exited as shown in Figure C-15.
C.3.2.2 States for Vehicle Safe/Deoraded Ooeratlon Vehicle Mod_
When the Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle Mode is in effect during post-landing,
the avionics states previously shown in Figure C-16 (in black and white) may be entered.
These states were previously described in Section C.2.2.3. This mode is also concerned with
providing the post-landing support needed on another planetary body to enable the crew to
survive and support the mission's science and payload processing systems after a severe
anomaly has occurred. On Earth, vehicle safe/degraded operation is concerned with
enabling the vehicle to returned to its post-mission processing facility despite the severe
anomaly. (Recall that an anomaly which requires the onboard SOCS, crew or FSS to place
the entire vehicle into Vehicle Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle mode is caused by a
problem beyond the capacity of the avionics to respond in a manner transparent to vehicle
operation.) This vehicle mode is entered either from the Landing Mission Mode's Vehicle
Safe/Degraded Operation Vehicle Mode or from the Post-Landing Mission Mode's Normal
Operation Vehicle Mode if the severe anomaly occurs after touchdown. It is exited as
shown in Figure C-15.
C.3.2.3 States for Inteorated System Test Vehicle Mode
When the Integrated System (End-to-End) Test Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics
subsystem states previously shown in Figure C-7 (in black and white) may be entered in the
Post-Landing Mission Mode. These states were previously described in Section C.1.2.4. This
mode is concerned with supporting any extensive testing that may be desired by crew or FSS
after touchdown to identify and resolve any anomalies that cannot wait for identification
and resolution in the Kennedy Space Flight Center's (KSFC) operations analysis after the
mission's return to KSFC. This mode is entered and exited as shown in Figure C-7.
C.3.2.4 States for Periodic Maintenance Vehicle MO0_
When the Periodic Maintenance Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics subsystem states
previously shown in Figure C-9 (in black and white) may be entered in the Post-Landing
Mission Mode. These states were previously described in Sections C.1.2.6 and C.2.4.8. This
mode is concerned with providing the controls to support the crew or FSS as they work on
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identifying and resolving accumulatedanomalies (primarily while landed on other
planetary bodies). Since the vehicle is assumed to be landed on another planetary body for
this periodic maintenance, critical tasks such as life support or communications to payloads
for science mission support must continue. This mode is entered and exited as shown in
Figure C-9.
C.3.2.5 States for Vehicle Shut-Down Vehicle Mode
When the Vehicle Shut-Down Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics subsystem states
shown previously in Figure C-8 (in black and white) may be entered in the Post-Landing
Mission Mode. These states were previously described in Section C.1.2.5. This mode is
concerned with providing the controls to safely shut-down the avionics not needed for
critical crew or FSS support tasks, and not needed to support payload and science operations
processing while landed on another planetary body. On Earth, this mode provides for
controls to minimally operate avionics needed (for example to download mission tapes and
maintenance data logs) until FSS is ready to order avionics to be fully shut-down.
C.3.3 STATES ALLOWED IN SHUT-DOWN MISSION MODE
In the Shut-Down Mission Mode, vehicle modes which can be utilized are Integrated
System Test, Periodic Maintenance, Vehicle Shut-Down and Vehicle off, as previously
shown in Figure C-19. This mode would probably only be available to a spacecraft landed
on Earth and the crew are preparing to depart from the vehicle, a spacecraft that will remain
on another planetary body and its mission is complete, or a spacecraft in Orbit Coast Mission
Mode that has completed its mission. The following subsections identify the avionics
subsystem states aUowable in each of these vehicle modes.
C.3.3.1 _;tates for Intearated System Test Vehicle Mode
When the Integrated System (End-to-End) Test Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics
subsystem states previously shown in Figure C-7 (in black and white) may be entered in the
Shut-Down Mission Mode. These states were previously described in Section C.1.2.4. This
mode is concerned with continuing Post-Landing testing or supporting any other extensive
testing that may be desired by crew or FSS prior to turning the vehicle off. While this
mode can be used on Earth to identify and resolve any anomalies in the KSFC operations
analysis after the mission's return to KSFC, it is assumed this is not a primary purpose of
this mode. It is entered and exited as shown in Figure C-7.
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C.3.3.2 States for Periodic Maintenance Vehl¢lo Modo
When the Periodic Maintenance Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics subsystem states
previously shown in Figure C-9 (in black and white) may be entered in the Shut-Down
Mission Mode. These states were previously described in Sections C.1.2.6 and C.2.4.8. This
mode is concerned with providing the controls to support the crew or FSS as they work on
identifying and resolving accumulated anomalies (primarily while landed on other
planetary bodies). Since the vehicle is assumed to be landed on another planetary body for
this periodic maintenance, critical tasks such as life support or communications to payloads
for science mission support must continue. This mode is entered and exited as shown in
Figure C-9.
C.3.3.3 States for Vehlcle Shut-Down Vehlcle Mode
When the Vehicle Shut-Down Vehicle Mode is in effect, the avionics subsystem states
shown previously in Figure C-8 (in black and white) may be entered in the Shut-Down
Mission Mode. These states were previously described in Section C.1.2.5. This mode is
concerned with providing the controls to safely shut-down the avionics after the vehicle
has returned to Earth. It provides for controls to minimally operate avionics needed (for
example to download mission tapes and maintenance data logs) until FSS is ready to order _,-
avionics to be fully powered down.
C.3.3.4 States for Vehlcle Off V_hl¢l¢ MO_Q
When the Vehicle Off Vehicle Mode is in effect, the only applicable avionics state is
ALL_OFF, as previously shown in Figure C-4. In the Shut-Down Mission Mode, this
vehicle mode and state are entered when a decision is made to terminate the mission and
no further avionics processing is needed. An external power off command signal must be
issued by the FSS to fully power down the spacecraft. This transition cannot be created by
the spacecraft SDSS (as noted by the lack of an arrow from shut-down to off modes), and is
described in Section C.1.2.1.
C.5 AVIONICS SUBSYSTEM STATES AND SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED
Function states describe the control of the major functional service entities within an
avionics subsystem. Only the SDSS avionics subsystem functional service entities are
addressed in this document in accordance with the objectives of this modeling effort.
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However, the analysis is expandable to address service functions for other avionics
subsystems. As previously shown in figure B-2 and as described in paragraph B.1, the SDSS
functional service entities are the DSM, NSM, OS, DBM and the IOSM. Regardless of the
mission mode, vehicle mode, or avionics state, any interaction within the system in other
than OFF modes or states will require support from the SDSS service functional entities.
Each SDSS functional state defines a boundary of allowable SDSS functional behavior. Each
state encompasses the set of commands, controls, events, conditions and procedures needed
to safely operate the SDS in a stable manner. The transitions from one state to another
establish how the SDSS functional entities transition from one stable set of processes and
table look up tables to another. For instance, "Full Service Operation" state establishes the
allowable conditions for normal calls to services such as Data Base Write, while a state such
as "Scheduled Testing" calls up the controls needed for specific built-in tests such as
memory self-test to be run.
The availability of each SDSS functional state depends upon the Avionics Subsystem States
in effect, since the avionics states control the behavior of the SDSS as it support external
activities. Note that the action of any specific state may vary depending upon which
mission and vehicle modes are in effect at the time the state is entered. The following
subsections identify all the combinations of allowable avionics and SDSS functional states.
C.5.1 SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED IN ALL_OFF AVIONICS
SUBSYSTEM STATE
In the ALL_OFF Avionics Subsystem State, SDSS Functional States which can be utilized
are none, as shown in Figure C-20. If the avionics are off, as previously described in Section
C.1.2.1, then the SDSS has no applicable states because it takes an external power signal or
command to start the bootup process. The default entry into an operable SDSS is the
SDSS_LOADED state which occui's after a vehicle mode change out of the Vehicle Off
Vehicle Mode as described in Section C.1.2.1.
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C.5.2 SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED IN START_SDSS AVIONICS
SUBSYSTEM STATE
In the START_SDSS Avionics Subsystem State, SDSS Functional States which can be
utilized are shown in Figure C-21. The default entry into an operable SDSS is the
SDSS_LOADED state which occurs after a vehicle mode change out of the Vehicle Off
Vehicle Mode as described in Section C.1.2.2. The SDSS Functional States are described
below.
• SDSS LOADED SDSS Functional State. When the mission mode changes to
cause the START_SDSS Avionics Subsystem State to execute, this executes the
power-up process by booting the SDSS loader, loading the SDSS initial program
code, and executing the SDSS startup program. The SDSS_LOADED state is in
effect while the SDSS is booting and loading, performing the POST for the SDSS
processors, and ensures that all SDSS linkages are working. This includes
capabilities to cold start (start from an initial services power off condition but boot
program still loaded) and warm start (start services by reloading the services
except for the OS which continues to execute). This state is exited when the SDSS
indicates that it is loaded and ready for configuration to the mission and vehicle.
• _DSS CONFIG & INIT SDSS Functional State. While in the START_SDSS
Avionics Subsystem State, after the SDSS has successfully loaded, it must be
tailored to the mission and vehicle to be supported. This state provides that the
SDSS configuration data will be loaded (or re-loaded in a restart condition). For
instance, the applications to be run, the priorities to be used, the
crew/GSS/FSS/SOCS commands and controls to govern processing execution
unless overridden, and linkages of allowable communications and calls upon
services to be accepted must be set up. Then the initial operating condition data
is installed and the SDSS confirms the services have been properly initialized (or
re-initialized in a restart condition).
• SDSS STANDBY SDSS Functional State. After the SDSS has loaded, been
configured and initialized for the vehicle, then it enters the SDSS_STANDBY
state where it awaits commands to execute or requests for services. It exits this
state each time such a command or request is received. In the START_SDSS
avionics state, this is the normal state for SDSS to wait in since no applications
execution may take place until after the applications are loaded. The SDSS is
fully loaded and ready to operate.
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SDSS SHUT-DOWN SDSS Functional State. If necessary, the SDSS_SHUT-
DOWN state may be entered to turnoff power to all elements of the SDSS except
for the boot processing capability. SDSS cannot turn itself fully off as a safety
precaution. This state provides for the orderly saving of state data and the
subsequent shut-down of SDSS capabilities.
C.5.3 SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED IN AV_CONFIG_&_INIT AVIONICS
SUBSYSTEM STATE
In the AV_CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State, SDSS Functional States which can
be utilized are shown in Figure C-22. The normal entry into an operable SDSS is the
SDSS_STANDBY state which occurs after the SDSS has been loaded. (The
AV_CONFIG & INIT Avionics Subsystem State was described in Section C.1.2.2.) The
SDSS Functional States are described below.
• SDSS LOADED SDSS Functional State. When the avionics are being loaded,
configured and initialized, there may be a need to re-load the SDSS services. If so,
this state provides the controls to enable the re-load of the SDSS, except for the
boot program.
• SDSS CONFIG & INIT SDSS Functional State. If the SDSS does get re-loaded,
then this state provides for re-configuring and re-initializing the SDSS.
• SDSS STANDBY SDSS Functional State. This state is the normal SDSS state
while awaiting commands or requests for service. Exit from this state occurs
when a command or request is received and approved by SDSS for execution.
• FULL SERVICE OPERATION SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
controls to respond to onboard SOCS, FSS, GSS or crew commands to load
application software, configure and initialize the avionics selected for use. It
executes the command or request involved in such activities and places the
applications into standby when their initialization is completed.
• SCHEDULED TESTING SDSS Functional State. During AV_CONFIG & INIT,
if it is necessary to execute tests either in response to POST results, or to fault
detection capabilities, then this state provides the controls needed for scheduling
the test, controlling the related test resources, capturing the resulting data and
providing a report on results. This state knows the tests available and conditions
needed for execution. It does not necessarily do extensive checking to determine
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that the test called for is appropriate to the avionics state, vehicle mode or
mission mode; such context checking must be performed elsewhere.
SDSS SHUT-DOWN SDSS Functional State. If the AV_CONFIG & INIT is
unsuccessful or is terminated without successful completion for other reasons,
then this state provides the controls to properly shut-down the SDSS. Only the
SDSS boot program cannot be shut-down in this state; such action requires an
external power off signal.
C.5.4 SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED IN AV_SUBSYS_STANDBY AVIONICS
SUBSYSTEM STATE
In the AV_SUBSYS_STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State, SDSS Functional States which
can be utilized are shown in Figure C-23. The normal entry into an operable SDSS is the
SDSS_STANDBY state which occurs after the SDSS has been loaded, configured and
initialized. (The AV_SUBSYS._STANDBY Avionics Subsystem State was described in
Section C.1.2.2.) The SDSS Functional States are described below.
• SDSS LOADED SDSS Functional State. When the avionics are in standby and
undergoing CBIT, there may be a need to re-load the SDSS services to respond to
possible failures. If so, this state provides the controls to enable the re-load of the
SDSS, except for the boot program.
• SDSS CONFIG & INIT SDSS Functional State. If the SDSS does get re-loaded,
then this state provides for re-configuring and re-initializing the SDSS.
• SDSS STANDBY SDSS Functional State. This state is the normal SDSS state
while awaiting commands or requests for service. Exit from this state occurs
when a command or request is received and approved by SDSS for execution.
When the avionics are also in standby, few commands or requests may be
encountered other than status maintenance types of services, such as to support
CBIT.
• FULL SERVICE OPERATION SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
controls to respond to avionics state requests for services in association with
responding to possible failures or other standby service requests. It executes the
command or request involved in such activities then returns to
SDSS_STANDBY when completed.
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• SDSS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
SDSS fall back capability if failures interfere with the ability of the SDSS to
provide full service operation. If the applications will still need to be supported,
and restarts fail to restore full service capability, then this state provides less
capable service operation.
• SCHEDULED TESTING SDSS Functional State. During
AV_SUBSYS_STANDBY, SDSS will respond to requests for services to support
fault detection capabilities. This state provides the controls needed for handling
the CBIT or other service requests for tests.
• SDSS SHUT-DOWN SDSS Functional State. While the avionics are in standby,
if it becomes necessary to shut-down the SDSS (except for the boot program) to
either reboot or to stop processing, then this state provides the controls to do so
properly. Only the SDSS boot program cannot be shut-down in this state; such
action requires an external power off signal.
C.5.5 SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED IN MANUAL_OP
AVIONICS SUBSYSTEM STATE
In the MANUAL_OP Avionics Subsystem State, SDSS Functional States which can be
utilized are shown in Figure C-24. In manual avionics operations, all the SDSS capabilities
must be available to respond to any manual inputs provided by the FSS or crew. (The
MANUAL_OP Avionics Subsystem State was described in Section C.1.2.2.) The SDSS
Functional States are described below.
• SDSS LOADED SDSS Functional State. When the avionics are under manual
control, the FSS, GSS or crew may direct a re-load of the SDSS services. If so, this
state provides the controls to enable the re-load of the SDSS, except for the boot
program.
• _DSS CONFIG & INIT SDSS Functional State. If the SDSS does get re-loaded,
then this state provides for re-configuring and re-initializing the SDSS.
• SDSS STANDBY SDSS Functional State. This state is the normal SDSS state
while awaiting commands or requests for service. Exit from this state occurs
when a command or request is received and approved by SDSS for execution.
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• FULL SERVICE OPERATION SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
controls to respond to avionics state requests for services in association with
responding to FSS, GSS or crew service directions. It executes the command or
request involved in such activities then returns to SDSS_STANDBY when
completed.
• SDSS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
SDSS fall back capability if failures interfere with the ability of the SDSS to
provide full service operation. If the FSS, GSS or crew still need to be supported,
and restarts fail to restore full service capability, then this state provides less
capable service operation.
• SDSS MAINTENANCE SDSS Functional State. This state provides the crew,
FSS or GSS capability to operate the SDSS under maintenance conditions, with
special maintenance states, programs and equipment to resolve critical
anomalies.
• SCHEDULED TESTING SDSS Functional State. During manual control, SDSS
will respond to requests for services to test any capabilities. This state provides
the controls needed for handling any service requests for tests.
• SDSS SHUT-DOWN SDSS Functional State. While the avionics are under
manual control, if it becomes necessary to shut-down the SDSS (except for the
boot program) to either reboot or to stop processing, then this state provides the
controls to do so properly. Only the SDSS boot program cannot be shut-down in
this state (by SDSS); such action requires an external power off signal. Even
under manual control, safety overrides would have to be bypassed by the crew,
FSS or GSS to fully power down the SDSS by external power off signal since no
processing support, reboot support, life support or other critical services would be
available during such a power off condition, and the ability of the spacecraft to
restart might not be assumable.
C.$.fi SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED IN COMPUTER-AIDED OP AVIONICS
SUBSYSTEM STATE
In the COMPUTER-AIDED_OP Avionics Subsystem State, SDSS Functional States which
can be utilized are shown in Figure C-25. (The COMPUTER-AIDED_OP Avionics
Subsystem State was described in Section C.2.4.5.) The SDSS Functional States are described
below.
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• SDSS CONFIG & INIT SDSS Functional State. When the avionics are in
COMPUTER-AIDED_OP, there may be a need to re-configure and re-initialize the
SDSS t6 accommodate different planned applications processing requirements.
• SDSS STANDBY SDSS Functional State. This state is the normal SDSS state
while awaiting commands or requests for service. Exit from this state occurs
when a command or request is received and approved by SDSS for execution.
• FULL SERVICE OPERATION SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
controls to respond to avionics state requests for services. It executes the
command or request involved in such activities then returns to
SDSS_STANDBY when completed.
• SDSS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
SDSS fall back capability if failures interfere with the ability of the SDSS to
provide full service operation. If the applications still need to be supported, and
restarts fail to restore full service capability, then this state provides less capable
service operation.
• SCHEDULED TESTING SDSS Functional State. During normal avionics
operation, SDSS will respond to requests for services to handle CBIT or other
service requests for tests.
• SDSS SHUT-DOWN SDSS Functional State. While the avionics are normal
operation, if it becomes necessary to shut-down the SDSS (except for the boot
program) to either reboot or to stop processing, then this state provides the
controls to do so properly. Only the SDSS boot program cannot be shut-down in
this state; such action requires an external power off signal.
C.5.7 SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED IN AVIONICS__SAFF../DEGRADED_OPN
AVIONICS SUBSYSTEM STATE
In the AVIONICS_SAFE/DEGRADED_OPN Avionics Subsystem State, SDSS Functional
States which can be utilized are shown in Figure C-26. (The AVIONICS_SAFE
/DEGRADED_OPN Avionics Subsystem State was described in Section C.2.4.5.) The SDSS
Functional States are described below.
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• SDSS CONFIG & IN'IT SDSS Functional State. When the avionics are
operating in a state of safe or degraded operations, it may be necessary for the
SDSS to be reconfigured. This state provides for re-configuring and then re-
initializing the SDSS.
• SDSS STANDBY SDSS Fiznctional State. This state is the normal SDSS state
while awaiting commands or requests for service. Exit from this state occurs
when a command or request is received and approved by SDSS for execution.
• FULL SERVICE OPERATION SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
controls to respond to avionics state requests for services. It executes the
command or request involved in such activities then returns to
SDSS_STANDBY when completed.
• SDSS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
SDSS fall back capability if failures interfere with the ability of the SDSS to
provide full service operation. If the applications will still need to be supported,
and restarts fail to restore full service capability, then this state provides less
capable service operation.
• SCHEDULED TESTING SDSS Functional State. During AVIONICS_SAFE
/DEGRADED_OPN, SDSS will respond to requests for services to continue
attempting to resolve the anomaly which holding the avionics in a safe or
degraded condition. This state provides the controls needed for handling the
CBIT or other service requests for tests.
• SDSS SHUT-DOWN SDSS Functional State. While the avionics are in safe or
degraded operating conditions, if it becomes necessary to shut-clown the SDSS
(except for the boot program) to either reboot or to stop processing, then this state
provides the controls to do so properly. Only the SDSS boot program cannot be
shut-down in this state; such action requires an external power off signal.
C.5.8 SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED IN AV_SUBSYS_TRAINING AVIONICS
SUBSYSTEM STATE
In the AV_SUBSYS_TRAINING Avionics Subsystem State, SDSS Functional States which
can be utilized are shown in Figure C-27. (The AV SUBSYS_TRAINING Avionics
Subsystem State was described in Section C.2.4.6.) The SDSS Functional States are described
below.
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• FULL SERVICE OPERATION SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
controls to respond to avionics simulation or other training program state
requests for services in association with providing training to the crew. It
executes the command or request involved in such activities then returns to
SDSS_STANDBY when completed. The SDSS tracks all training data to ensure
no possible cross-over or contamination between training data and real
operational mission data. The SDSS recognizes real operational mission alerts
and warnings and provides overrides to the training subsystem to clearly indicate
non-training information which is critical in nature.
• SDSS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN SDSS Functional State. During training
operations, this state provides the SDSS interlock capability to protect critical and
other vehicle capabilities from responding to training subsystem direction as if it
were real direction. (The SDSS ensures system safety by tracking and controlling
training data and control commands.) The FULL_SERVICE_OPERATION is
inhibited from responding to overrides while in training mode; such actions
require special SAFE state handling for safety and security protection, although
such actions must still be responded to immediately.
• SCHEDULED TESTING SDSS Functional State. During
AV_SUBSYS_TRAINING, SDSS will respond to requests for services to support
fault detection capabilities. This state is independent of the training activities to
ensure the training and other systems actually function properly. This state
provides the controls needed for handling the CBIT or other service requests for
tests.
C.5.9 SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED IN INTERRUPTIVETEST AVIONICS
SUBSYSTEM STATE
In the INTERRUI_IVE_TEST Avionics Subsystem State, SDSS Functional States which can
be utilized are shown in Figure C-28. (The INTERRUI_IVE_TEST Avionics Subsystem
State was described in Section C.1.2.2.) The SDSS Functional States are described below.
• SDSS LOADED SDSS Functional State. After the avionics undergo tests which
interrupt normal processing capability, there may be a need to re-load the SDSS
services to restore the capability to respond normally. If so, this state provides the
controls to enable the re-load of the SDSS, except for the boot program.
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• _DSS CON-FIG & INIT SDSS Functional State. If the SDSS does get re-loaded,
then this state provides for re-configuring and re-initializing the SDSS.
• _DSS STANDBY SDSS Functional State. This state is the normal SDSS state
while awaiting commands or requests for service. Exit from this state occurs
when a command or request is received and approved by SDSS for execution.
• FULL SERVICt_ OPERATION SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
controls to respond to avionics state requests for test services. It executes the test
command or request involved and schedules the specific tests to be conducted.
• _;CHEDULED TESTING SDSS Functional State. After tests are scheduled in the
FULL_SERVICE_OPERATION state, this state performs the actual tests, and
handles the results. The normal exit from this state is through
SDSS_CONFIG & INIT to ensure that all test data has been properly purged
from memory and state conditions are reset to normal processing.
• SDSS SHUT-DOWN SDSS Functional State. An alternative exit from SDSS
Function States supporting interruptive testing is through a complete shut-down
of the SDSS (except for the boot program). This may be to either reboot or to stop
processing; this state provides the controls to do so properly. Only the SDSS boot
program cannot be shut-down in this state; such action requires an external
power off signal.
C.5.10 SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED IN AV_SUBSYS_MAINTENANCE
AVIONICS SUBSYSTEM STATE
in the AV_SUBSYS_MAINTENANCE Avionics Subsystem State, SDSS Functional States
which can be utilized are shown in Figure C-29. (The AV_SUBSYS MAINTENANCE
Avionics Subsystem State was described in Section C.1.2.4.) The SDSS Functional States are
described below.
• SDSS LOADED SDS$ Functional State. When the avionics are undergoing
maintenance, there may be a need to either load special maintenance enabled
versions of SDSS programs, or to re-load the SDSS normal services. If so, this
state provides the controls to load or re-load the SDSS, except for the boot
program.
• SDSS CONFIG & INIT SDSS Functional State. If the SDSS does get loaded or
re-loaded, then this state provides for re-configuring and re-initializing the SDSS.
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• SDSS STANDBY SDSS Functional State. This state is the normal SDSS state
while awaiting commands or requests for service. Exit from this state occurs
when a command or request is received and approved by SDSS for execution.
• FULL SERVICE OPERATION SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
controls to respond to avionics state requests for services in association with
maintenance of the system. It executes the command or request involved in
such activities then returns to SDSS_STANDBY when completed.
• SDSS MAINTENANCE SDSS Functional State. This state provides the crew,
FSS or GSS capability to operate special maintenance programs and maintenance
versions of the SDSS, with special maintenance states, programs and equipment
to resolve anomalies.
• SCHEDULED TESTING SDSS Functional State. During AV_SUBSYS_
MAINTENANCE, SDSS will respond to requests for test services to support
maintenance capabilities. This state provides the controls needed for handling
the special service requests for tests.
• _DSS SHUT-DOWN SDSS Functional State. When maintenance is completed,
the normal exit will to the SDSS_SHUT-DOWN state to ensure that all
maintenance data and programs are purged from memory. This state provides
the controls to properly shut-down the SDSS (except for the boot program) to
either reboot or to stop processing. Only the SDSS boot program cannot be shut-
down in this state; such action requires an external power off signal.
C.5.11 SDSS FUNCTION STATES ALLOWED IN AV SUBSYS_SHUT-DOWN
AVIONICS SUBSYSTEM STATE
In the AV_SUBSYS_SHUTDOWN Avionics Subsystem State, SDSS Functional States
which can be utilized are shown in Figure C-30. (The AV_SUBSYS_SHUT-DOWN
Avionics Subsystem State was described in Section C.1.2.2.) The SDSS Functional States are
described below.
• SDSS STANDBY SDSS Functional State. This state is the normal SDSS state
while awaiting commands or requests for service. Exit from this state occurs
when a command or request is received and approved by SDSS for execution.
When the avionics are shutting down, the shut-down request will cause a
transition to the SDSS_SHUT-DOWN state, rather than the
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FULL_SERVICE_OPERATION state, after the avionics applications and external
systems have been powered off.
• FULL SERVICE OPERATION SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
controls to respond to avionics state requests for services in association with
responding to avionics applications and related systems shut-down service
requests. It executes the command or request involved in such activities then
returns to SDSS_STANDBY when completed.
• SDSS SAFE/DEGRADED OPN SDSS Functional State. This state provides the
SDSS fall back capability if failures interfere with the ability of the SDSS to
provide full service operation. If the applications will still need to be shut-down,
and restarts fail to restore full SDSS service capability, then this state provides less
capable service operation for SDSS shut-down.
• SDSS SHUT-DOWN SDSS Functional State. After the avionics have been shut-
down, this state provides the capability and controls to shut-down the SDSS
(except for the boot program) to either reboot or to stop processing. Only the
SDSS boot program cannot be shut-down in this state; such action requires an
external power off signal.
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APPENDIX D
SGOAA SIMULATION PHASE 1
This appendix describes the Phase 1 results in the development of a dynamic architecture
simulation model using the Statemate CASE tool for validation of the SGOAA. The
Statemate CASE Tool is a development of the i-Logic Corporation and a copy is installed in
the NASA JSC Real Time Systems Engineering Laboratory (RSEL). A complete set of
documentation for this tool is also available in the RSEL. The following paragraphs
provide a short overview of the tool and how it was applied to the SGOAA. The
simulation model developed for the SGOAA resides as an application in the data base of the
Statemate CASE Tool installed in the RSEL.
D.1 MODELING LANGUAGES OF STATEMATE
Statemate has four modeling languages - Activity-charts, Statecharts, Module-charts and
Forms. These languages are completely described in the document entitled 'The Modeling
Languages of Statemate" located in the RSEL. For ease in interpreting this appendix a short
description of each of these languages is provided here. The following Staternate language
descriptions enclosed in parenthesis are extracted from the i-Logic Marketing Brochure
entitled 'q'he STATEMATE Approach to Complex Systems".
D.1.1 ACTIVITY CHARTS
"Functional issues are treated in Statemate using activities that represent the processing
capabilities of the system. Dealing with a customer's confirmation request in an airline
reservation system is an example of an activity, as is updating the aircraft's position in an
avionics system. Activities can be nested, forming a hierarchy that constitutes a functional
decomposition of the system. Items of information such as the distance to a target or the
customer's name, will typically flow between activities, and might also be kept in data
stores. This functional view of a system is captured with the language of Activity-charts,
which are similar to conventional flow diagrams." Activity-charts show the possible data
and control flows for the system.
Figure D-1 is the top level Activity-chart created for the SGOAA simulation. The structure
associated with this Activity-chart is shown in Figure D-2. The data dictionary is shown in
Table D-1.
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D.1.2 STATECHARTS
"Statecharts describe the dynamics of a systems behavior, and identify the conditions and
events causing transitions between states. Unlike conventional state transition diagrams,
Statecharts feature hierarchy (encapsulated states), concurrency, and broadcasting."
"Dynamic behavioral issues, commonly referred to as control aspects, are treated in
Statemate using the Statecharts language. Here, states (or modes) can be nested or linked in
a number of ways to represent sequential of concurrent behavior. An avionics mission
computer, for example, could be in one of three states, air-to-air, air-to-ground, or
navigation. At the same time, it must be in the state of either automatic or flight control.
Transition between states are typically triggered by events, which may be qualified by
conditions. Flipping a certain switch on the throttle, for example, is an event that will cause
a transition from the navigate state to the air-to-ground state, but only on the condition that
the aircraft has air-to-ground ammunition available."
Figure D-3 is a Statechart generated to describe avionics control for the SGOAA simulation
scenario. The structure associated with this Statechart is shown in Figure D-4. The data
dictionary is shown in Table D-2.
D.1.3 MODULE CHARTS
"Module-charts allow activities to be associated with the physical components of the system.
They identify the system modules used in the implementation, the external elements, and
the information and control channels between these components. This structural view
provides the basis for the transition to design."
Figure B-1 in Appendix B is a Module type chart for the Artemis CLL vehicle including the
allocation of functions to the various modules.
D.1.4 FORMS
"Certain non graphical parts of the modeling process, such as specifying the connections
between Module charts and Activity-charts or defining the structure of compound data
items, are carried out in the forms language of Statemate."
D-2
Statemate distinguishes between graphical elements, which are depicted graphically, and
textural elements which are not depicted graphically, but may appear as part of labels in the
charts. Graphical elements include states, activities, data-stores, modules, transitions,
connectors and flow-lines. There are two types of flow-lines: data flow-lines, drawn as solid
lines, and control flow-lines, drawn as dashed lines. Typically, control flow-lines carry
information or signals that are used in making control decisions, while data flow-lines carry
information that is used in computations and data-processing operations. Textual elements
include events, conditions, data-items, information-flows, and actions. Both types of
elements have forms that may contain further information, though among the graphical
elements only box elements (i.e., states, activities, data-stores and modules) have forms. All
five textual elements have forms, which contain the type and structure of data-items, the
decomposition of information-flows and also serve as the mechanism for defining
compound events, conditions, data-items and actions.
D.2 INTEGRATING ACTIVITY-CHARTS AND $TATE(_HART$
Associated with each Activity-chart will usually be a Statechart, called a control activity,
whose role is to control the activities and data flows for the Activity-chart. An example of a
control activity for an Activity-chart is @AVIONICS_CTRL_REV2 in Figure D-1. Figure
D-3 is the Statechart for that control activity.
D.3 DATA DI(_,TIONARIE$
A data dictionary is provided for each Activity-chart and for each Statechart. This data
dictionary defines the external activities associated with the charts and all of the flows
associated with the chart including those flows defined in lower level charts.
D.4 THE SGOAA MODEL
The Activity-charts, Statecharts and supporting forms developed during the build of the
SGOAA simulation are discussed in the following paragraphs and provided in the
associated figures and tables.
D.4.1 SGOAA ACTIVITY-CHART
The highest level SGOAA Activity-chart is shown in Figure D-1. This chart defines all of
the system elements, both internal and external, and the data and command flows between
these elements for the SGOAA as applied to the CLL. The AVIONICS activity is the large
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solid line box. The solid lines exiting the AVIONICS activity are the external interfaces.
Figure D-2 is the SGOAA Activity-chart structure diagram showing each of the defined
elements down to their lowest defined level and also identifies by figure number the lower
level detailed Activity-charts and/or Statecharts in the data base. For example, the
SPACE_DATA_SYS_SERVICES Activity-chart is Figure D-6 and the INIT_AV_CONFIG
Activity-chart is Figure D-11.
In the figure, AVIONICS_APPS contains all of the avionics application software. The data
flow interfaces from the applications to external elements are shown as solid lines such as
the interfaces from the GN&C application to the guidance system hardware
(GUIDANCE_HW) and propulsion system hardware (PROPULSION_HW).
AVIONICS_APPS has control flow interfaces to @AVIONICS_CTRL_REV2 expanded as a
Statechart in Figure D-3. @AVIONICS_CTRL_REV2 has control flow interfaces to
@SPACE_DATA_SYS_SERVICES expanded as a lower level Activity-chart in Figure D-6
and to the external activity GROUND_SPT_SYS.
Table D-1 is the SGOAA Activity-chart dictionary.
D.4.2 AVIONICS_.CTRL_REV2 STATECHART
The AVIONICS_CTRL_REV2 Statechart was shown in Figure D-3. It's role is to control the
activities and data flows of the activity in which it is contained. In this instance, it controls
the activities and data flows of the SGOAA Avionics activity and defines those states the
Avionics activity can assume from startup to shutdown. Figure D-4 is a state structure
diagram showing each of the AVIONICS_CTRL Statechart defined states down to their
lowest level and also identifies by figure number lower level detailed Statecharts in the data
base. For example, the START_SDSS Statechart is Figure D-7 and the AV_CONFIG_INIT
Statechart is Figure D-12.
Table D-2 is the AVIONICS_CTRL_REV2 Statechart dictionary.
D.4.3 PUP_AND_LOAD ACTIVITY-CHART
The PUP_AND_LOAD Activity-chart is shown in Figure D-5. It defines the activities
associated with the power up of the Avionics System, loading of SDSS system software and
the activation of the SDSS for performing its mission functions. Figure D-7 is the Statechart
for @Start_SDSS. Table D-3 is the Activity-chart dictionary for PUP_AND_LOAD.
I_4
D.4.4 SPACE_DATA_SYS._SERVICES ACTIVITY-CHART
Figure D-6 defines all of the SPACE_DATA_SYS_SERVICES elements, both internal and
external, and the data and command flows between these elements. The data dictionary in
Table D-4 defines the contents of these flows. Figure D-9 is the lower level
@SDDS_CTRL_REV1 Statechart. The functions of the SPACE_DATA_SYS_SERVICES
internal elements are defined in the SGOAA Standard.
D.4.5 START SDSS STATECHART
Figure D-7 is the Statechart for the @START_SDSS activity contained in Figure D-5, the
Powerup and Load Activity Chart. This chart defines those states the SDSS is put into in
getting all of the system processors up and running, loading of the system software and
handling any failures that might occur in the start up process. Table D-5 is the Statechart
dictionary for START_SDSS. Figure D-8 is the state structure diagram for START_SDSS.
D.4.6 SDSS_CTRL_REV1 STATECHART
Figure D-9 is the Statechart for the @SDSS_CTRL_REV1 control activity shown in Figure
D-6, the SDSS Activity-chart. This chart defines the SDSS operating and reset system
software states. Table D-6 is the SDSS_CTRL_REV1 Statechart dictionary and Figure D-10 is
the Statechart structure.
D.4.7 INIT_AV_CONFIG ACTIVITY-CHART
Figure D-1 defined an activity called @IN1T_AV_CONFIG. Figure D-11 is the Activity-chart
for that activity and defines all of those activities involved in the initial configuration of
the Avionics System. As defined in Figure D-3, the Avionics Control Statechart, the
activities defined in this figure occur following the SDSS activation. The external data flow
PON_SIGS contains power on commands for the Avionic Systems external to the SDSS.
PON_RESP is the data flow that reports the results of the power on commands. Table D-7 is
the INIT_AV_CONFIG Activity-chart dictionary.
D.4.8 AV CONFIG_INIT STATECHART
Figure D-12 is the Statechart for @AV_CONFIG_INIT. It defines the dynamic system
behavior involved in bringing all of the Avionics on-line and operational in a predefined
configuration, the handling of failures to power on and failures to load application
I_5
software. Retries and application of watchdog timers (time outs) is also defined. Table D-8
is the AV_CONFIG_INIT Statechart dictionary and Figure D-13 is the Statechart structure.
D.4.g INTERRUPTIVE_TEST STATECHART
Figure D-3, the Statechart for Avionics Control defined an INTERRUPTIVE_TEST state.
Figure D-14 describes the states for INTERRUPTIVE_TEST. It is the lower level Statechart
for that defined state and defines the dynamic system behavior to be exhibited by the system
during interruptive testing. The dictionary is shown in Table D-9 and the state structure in
Figure D-15.
D.4.10 SGOAA SCENARIO SIMULATION PANEL
This is the control panel for running the SGOAA scenario simulation. This panel is
displayed on the workstation monitor. Selection of a button, for example,
POWER_ON_AV causes that dynamic activity command to be made true in the statechart
in which it is defined. In this case POWER_ON_AV is defined in Figure D-3, the Avionics
Control Statechart. Table D-10 contains the script for the simulation. The GO ADVANCE
1.000000 in the script steps through the statechart one step at a time until all state changes
that are a direct result of the issued command have been executed allowing the system's
response to be viewed graphically, using the interactive simulation feature of the analyzer
package. The active elements in the charts (states that the system is in at that moment and
activities that are active) are highlighted graphically. The execution can also be made to
simulate the system running in real time and to keep track of the time dependent
information. At any point during the execution, the sta_ of non graphical elements such
as the value of a variable or a condition can also be viewed.
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STRUCTURE FOR SGA0:
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Figure 13-2. SGOAA Activity Structure
13-8
LEVEL 2
CONTINUE...
LEVEL 3
AVIONICS
ISPACE DATA SI IINIT AV CONFI
IYS SERVICES I fIG I
I
I I IAVIONICS_APP I
IPUP_AND_LOAD I IS I
1___/i._5- I ---.i I
I
IAVIONICS _CTR I
{L REV2 I
D-3 I
ISPACE DATA S[
IYS SERVICES I
I D-6 I
I SPACE DATA S I
IYS SERVICES {
I D-6 I
I
AVIONICS_CTR I
L REV2 I
m
D-3 S
IAVIONICS APP I
IS I
I I
I INI T_AV_CONF I
fIG I
I D-11 I
I I
I INI T_AV_CONF I I I
fIG I IELEC._PWR HW I
I D-If I I I
Figure D-2. SGOAA Activity Structure - continued
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Figure D-2. SGOAA Activity Structure - continued
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Figure D-2. SGOAA Activity Structure - continued
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Figure D-2. SGOAA Activity Structure - continued
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Figure D-2. SGOAA Activity Structure - continued
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Figure D-2. SGOAA Activity Structure - concluded
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STRUCTURE FOR AVIONICS CTRL REV2:
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Figure D-4. Avionics Control State Structure
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Figure EM. Avionics Control State Structure - concluded
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TableD-2. Avionics Control Statechart Dictionary
Dictionary for chart AVIONICS CTRL REV2
States with Static Reactions and Activities Throughout/Within
&V f_LqT9 S_BY
_e- _Yc
Reactions : exiting/st ! (AVIONICS_APPS)
Elements defined and/or used in chart AVIONICS CTRL REV2
/LVIONICS APPS (activity); defined in chart: SGA0
D_GRLDI MOOZ (condition) ; unresolved in chart: SGA0
DO AV STBY (event); unresolved in chart: AVIONICS CTRL REV2
DO IRTIRR_TIVZ TZST (event); unresolved in chart: AVIONICS
cTKL ,_v2 --
DOIOP
I_"72
(condition); unresolved in chart: AVIONICS CTRL
I_IT_AVCCMFZQ (activity); defined in chart: SGA0
Ia&XHTMOOm (condition); unresolved in chart: AVIONICS CTRL
ERr2 -- --
la&u'_RT_ (condition); unresolved in chart: SGA0
O_W _ (event); unresolved in chart: SGA0
POWIRO_.AV (event); unresolved in chart: SGA0
_Cm._V (event); unresolved in chart: SGA0
P_/_E) LO/&D (activity); defined in chart: SGA0
_/kCBDR_/&STSSIRVICR8 (activity); defined in chart: SGA0
TmD (condition); unresolved in chart: AVIONICS CTRL REV2
T/KLI_I_GM00m (condition); unresolved in chart: AVIONICS CTRL
REV2 -- --
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Figure D-5. Powerup and Load Activity Chart
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Table D-3. Powerup and Load Activity Chart Dictionary
Dictionary for chart PUP _D LOAD
Elements defined and/or used in chart PUP AND LOAD
LOAD _ _ F_ (condition); unresolved in chart: PUP AND
LOAD -- --
POST _ FAIL (condition); unresolved in chart: PUP AND
LOAD-- -- -- --
POST_UL_I_RRAK (condition); unresolved in chart: PUP AND LOAD
POST OTRER_F_IL (condition); unresolved in chart: PUP AND LOAD
_JLLL_K (condition); unresolved in chart: PUP AND LOAD
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Figure D-7. Start SDSS Statechart
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STRUCTURE FOR START SDSS:
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Figure D-8. Start_SDSS State Structure
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STRUCTURE FOR SDSS CTRL_REVI:
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Figure D-10. SDSS_CNTRL_REV1 State Structure
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I I I I
IDATA SYS _MGR I
J_CTRL J
I I
Figure D-10. SDSS_CNTRL_REV1 State Structure - continued
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I l
I I I I
i OPERATING I J RESET i
I l I l
INETWORK SERV I
l_MGR_.CTRL I
I I
l l
I I I I
I OPERATING I I RESET I
I I I I
lOP_SYS_SERV_ i
ICTRL I
I I
I l
I I I I
I OPERATING I I RESET I
I I I I
IDATA_BASE_MG l
iR_CTRL i
I I
Figure D-10. SDSS_CNTRL_REV1 State Structure - concluded
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I _P_ I
j !
PON RESP
INIT AV CONFIG
DO INIT
SOCS _ED
ILOAD SOCS_SW I
CT I_ _ED
LOAD CT SW
LOAD GNC SW I
E_._Z _DED
[_.o_s_ J
I
Figure D-11. Initial Avionics Configure Activity Chart
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Table D-7. Initial Avionics Configure Activity Chart Dictionary
v
Dictionary for chart INIT AV CONFIG
External Activities
ELEC _ H
external--activity in chart SGA0
Elements defined and/or used in chart INIT AV CONFIG
CT LOADED (oondition); unresolved in chart: INIT AV CONFIG
ELS LOADED (condition); unresolved in chart: INIT AV CONFIG
m
LOADZD (condition); unresolved in chart: INIT AV CONFIG
P(_ _ (information-flow); defined in chart: SGA0
ConTains: RADAR PON
ALTIMETER PON
TRANSMITTER PON
POSITION SYSPON
IMU PON
POm SIGS (information-flow); defined in chart: SGA0
Contains : DO RADAR PWR
DO--POSITYONSYS PWR
DO--_m PWR -- --
DO--TRANSMITTER PWR
DO--ALTI_R PWS
_LO_DID (condition); unresolved in chart: INIT AV CONFIG
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STRUCTURE FOR AV CONFIG INIT:
........ =_ = ===_.....
LEVEL 2
CONTINUE...
I
IAV__CONF IG_IN i
IZT I
I D-12 I
IAV CONFIG INi
liT: i
I D-12 I
IAV_CONr IG_IN I
JIT I
I D-12 I
iSTART_stm_sxl
IS I
I l
I
I DO INIT
I
I I I
I i DO CONFIG I
I I I
I I
iLOAD FAILURE i
I I
I I
l STATE#39 l
I I
Figure D-13. AV_CONFIG_INIT State Structure
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LEVEL 3
CONTINUE...
ISTART_STmS_I
IS I
I I
I I
I [ I TRANSMITTER_ I
I RADAR ON I I ON I
I - I I I
I
I I
I IMU ON I
I I
I
IPOSITION_SYS I
ION I
I I
I
I t
IALTIMETER_ON I
I I
I I
I STATE#39 ]
I I
I I
I I I I
[ RETRY I I LOADING I
1 I I I
LEVEL 4
I I
I RETRY I
I I
I I
I I I I
I NO RETRY I ] ONE RETRY I "
I - I I - I
Figure D-13. AV_CONFIG_INIT State Structure - continued
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I I
ILOAD SOCS SWi
I I
l I
I LOAD ING I
I i
I
I
_m
I I i
I I I I I I
iLOAD__ELS_SW I ILOAD_GNC_SW i I LOAD CT SW I
I I I I I I
Figure D-13. AV_CONFIG_INIT State Structure - concluded
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Table D-9. Interruptive Test Statechart Directory
Dictionary for chart INTERRUPTIVE TEST
Elements defined and/or used in chart INTERRUPTIVE TEST
PUB _ (event); unresolved in chart: INTERRUPTIVE TEST
RITRY (event); unresolved in chart: INTERRUPTIVE TEST
TIST (event); unresolved in chart: INTERRUPTIVE TEST
TEST F_ (event); unresolved in chart: INTERRUPTIVE TEST
RI_ULT SDSS (event); unresolved in chart: INTERRUPTIVE
TEST-- --
P_T SUBSYS (event) ; unresolved in chart: INTERRUPTIVE
TEST- -
Rm_Y F_ (event); unresolved in chart: INTERRUPTIVE
TEST
TEST SDS8 (event); unresolved in chart: INTERRUPTIVE TEST
TLgT_SUBST8 (event); unresolved in chart: INTERRUPTIVE TEST
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STRUCTURE FOR INTERRUPTIVE TEST:
IINTERRUPTIVEI
[_TEST: i
I 0-14 I
iINTERP, UPTIVEi
[_TEST [
I 0-14 I
LEVEL 2
CONTINUE...
IINTERRUPTIVE[
[_TEST I
I 0-14 I
I
I I
I TESTING SDSS I
I I
IDETERMINE_TYI
IPE_TESTING I
i I
I I I
iWAIT FOR CMDI IEVAL_TEST_REI
[_TEST -- [ [ SULT l
I I I I
[TESTING SUBSI
IYs I
I i
Figure D-15. Interrptive Test State Structure
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LEVEL 3
_mm_uDmmllmm_--
I
lCOUNT RETRIE i
is I
I I
mm_om_mmommmDm
iDETERMINE TYE
IPE TESTING j
I I
Figure D-15. Interruptive Test State Structure - concluded
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Table D-10. SCRIPT Simulation Demonstration
VARIABT._.
INTEGER
BOOLEAN
BOOLEAN
FLOAT
INIT
nondet no;
step_m_de;
notify_mode;
random_seed;
nondet no := 0 ;
fs!(no_ify_mode) ;
fs! (step_mode) ;
write('Playback RUN2. \n');
END INIT;
SET BREAKPOINT [ STEP ] DO
IF (notify mode) THZN
WRITE('PLAYBACK# STEP :',step_number,' TIME
END IF;
IF (step mode) THEN
WRITE(TPLAYBACK# Type cont to continue\n');
SET INTERACTIVE;
END IF;
END BREAKPOINT;
:',cur clock,'\n\n');
BEGIN
GO STEP;
GO REPEAT;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Event POWER ON AV generated\n');
write('Script paused, type "_on_" to continue. \n');
set interactive;
POWER ON AV;
GOAD--VANCE 1.000000
GO ADVANCE 1.000000
GO ADVANCE 1.000000
GO ADVANCE 1.000000
GO ADVANCE 1.000000
GO ADVANCE 1.000000,
GO ADVANCE 1.000000,
GO ADVANCE 1.000000,
GO ADVANCE 1.000000,
GO ADVANCE 1.000000,
GO ADVANCE 1.000000,
GO ADVANCE 1.000000,
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Activity POST SDSS MASTER stopped\n');
write('Script paused, type "con--t" t_ continue. \n');
set interactive;
sp! (POST SDSS MASTER);
GO ADVAN_E I._00000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
Table D-IO. SCRIPT Simulation Demonstration - continued
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Condition POWER ALL NAK was changed to TRUE\n');
write('Script paused, type "cont T to--continue. \n');
set interactive;.
POWER ALL NAK := TRUE;
GO ADVANC_ 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
WRITE ('PLAYBACK# Activity POWERUP OTHER stopped\n');
write('Script paused, type "cont"--to continue. \n');
set interactive;
sp!(POWERUP OTHER);
GO ADVANCE T.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Event CYCLE_POWER generated\n');
CYCLE POWER;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
WRITE ('PLAYBACK# Condition POWER_ALL_NAK was changed to FALSE\n');
POWER ALL NAK := FALSE;
GO ADVANC_ 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Activity POWERUP_OTHER stopped\n');
sp!(POWERUP_OTHER);
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Activity POST_SDSS_OTHER stopped\n');
sp! (POST SDSS OTHER);
GO ADVANCE 1._00000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Activity LOAD_SYS_SERV_SW stoppedkn');
sp! (LOAD SYS SERV SW};
GO ADVANCE I_0000_0;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
WRITE ('PLAYBACK# Condition RADAR_PON was changed to TRUE\n');
RADAR PON :s TRUE;
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Condition ALTIMETER_PON was changed to TRUE\n');
ALTIMETER PON :- TRUE;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
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Table D-IO. SCRIPT Simulation Demonstration - continued
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
WRITE('PLAMBACK# Condition TRANSMITTER PON was changed to TRUE\n');
TRANSMITTER_PON :m TRUE;
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Condition POSITION_SYS_PON was changed to TRUE\n');
POSITION SYS PON := TRUE;
GO ADVANC--E 1TO00000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
GO ADVANCE 1.000000;
WRITE ('PLAYBACK# Condition IMU PON was changed to TRUE\n');
write('Script paused, type "co_t" to continue. \n');
set interactive;
IMU PON := TRUE;
GO NEXT;
GO STEP;
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Condition SOCSLOADED was changed to TRUE\n');
SOCS LOADED :_ TRUE;
GO STEP;
GO NEXT;
GO STEP;
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Condition CT_LOADED was changed to TRUE\n');
CT LOADED :_ TRUE;
GO STEP;
GO NEXT;
GO STEP;
GO NEXT;
GO STEP;
GO NEXT;
GO NEXT;
GO STEP;
write('Script paused, type "cont" to continue. \n'};
set interactive;
GO BACK;
WRITE ('PLAYBACK# Condition GNC LOADED was changed to TRUE\n');
GNC LOADED := TRUE;
GO STEP;
GO BACK;
GO BACK;
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Condition GNC LOADED was changed to TRUE\n');
GNC LOADED :t TRUE;
GO STEP ;
GO STEP ;
GO STEP;
WRITE ('PLAYBACK# Condition ELS_LOADED was changed to TRUE\n');
ELS LOADED :_ TRUE;
GO STEP;
GO STEP;
WRITE('PLAYBACK# Activity DO CONFIG stopped\n');
sp! (DO CONFIG) ;
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TableD-IO. SCRIPT Simulation Demonstration - concluded
GO STEP;
WRITE ('pLAYBACK# .Activity DO_INIT stopped\n' ) ;
sp! (DO_INIT) ;
GO STEP;
GO STEP ;
END;
END.
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